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ABSTRACT
Transgender student protections are at the center of the most recent debate about the scope
of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. Although LGBTQ+ rights and protections have
greatly expanded under all areas of the law in the last thirty years, transgender student rights have
most successfully advanced through the judicial system.
Through a close evaluation of executive, judicial, and legislative responses to this
compelling policy issue, the development of transgender student rights is explored. This analysis,
which provides a comprehensive overview of the current legal landscape of transgender student
protections, ultimately determines that the courts are the best avenue for securing transgender
student protections under the law. This research contributes fresh insight into the transgender
student rights debate in order to further support and legitimize the argument for extending Title
IX’s protections, especially through litigation on behalf of LGBTQ+ students.
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INTRODUCTION
The recent visibility and acceptance of transgender individuals is both celebrated and
highly controversial, generating vehement discussions among all levels of the government, various
ideological groups, and citizens across the country. In the last thirty years, the expansion of
transgender legal protections has been propelled by two foundational pieces of legislation: Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. Title VII,
which established the principles for addressing sex discrimination in the workplace, makes it
illegal to discriminate against any employee on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.”1 Similarly in the educational context, Title IX states that “No person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.”2 Although the statute was enacted to combat disparate treatment between the sexes in
educational venues, Congress ruled that some sex segregation is permissible in certain
circumstances, such as bathrooms, dorms, single-sex schools, fraternities and sororities, boys’ and
girls’ clubs, and athletics.3 Educational institutions that fail to comply with Title IX guidelines risk
losing federal funding, making the statute applicable to nearly every college, university, and
primary and secondary school throughout the country.
Though Title IX was originally enacted to create and provide equal educational
opportunities for women, over the last fifty years it has been interpreted and expanded to address
three primary concerns: equitable interscholastic and intercollegiate athletic opportunities for

1

“Civil Rights Act of 1964,” Pub. L. No. 88–353, § 78 Stat. 241 (1964),
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/CivilRightsActOf1964.pdf.
2
“Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,” Pub. L. No. 92–138, § 86 Stat. 235 (1972),
https://www.justice.gov/crt/title-ix-education-amendments-1972.
3
Elizabeth Kaufer Busch and William E. Thro, Title IX: The Transformation of Sex Discrimination in Education
(Routledge, 2018), 13.
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female students, sexual misconduct claims on college campuses, and most recently, protection
from discrimination for LGBTQ+ students.
While the Department of Education’s (DOE) Office of Civil Rights (OCR) was initially
tasked with overseeing and implementing Title IX, in the last fifty years the statute’s protections,
much like those under Title VII, have significantly expanded in state legislatures and throughout
the lower court system. Title IX’s private right of action, recognized by the Supreme Court in its
1979 decision in Cannon v. University of Chicago, allows students to file complaints outside of
the OCR with the courts to address discriminatory treatment in schools.4 Through subsequent
judicial decisions, courts have significantly weighed in on the meaning and scope of the statute.
While state legislatures do not have the power to modify Title IX guidelines, they are responsible
for ensuring the statute’s policies are implemented in their public universities and schools. State
legislators, however, do have broad power to regulate educational institutions within their borders.
Therefore, state-level education policies often overlap with many issues that Title IX addresses,
especially those involving the highly controversial topic of transgender students.
The divided authority and policymaking oversight for Title IX regulations at all levels of
the government allow elected officials, administrators, and the courts to all intervene in the
decision-making process. Professor R. Shep Melnick, an expert in the field, calls this “institutional
leapfrogging” to underscore how Title IX policies do not move in a linear fashion, but rather in an
often-disjointed manner.5 According to Melnick, this form of policymaking has enabled the
statute’s scope and power to expand exponentially over time.6

4
“Cannon v. Univ. of Chi. Case Brief for Law School,” Community, accessed April 24, 2022,
https://www.lexisnexis.com/community/casebrief/p/casebrief-cannon-v-univ-of-chi.
5
R. Shep Melnick, The Transformation of Title IX: Regulating Gender Equality in Education (The Brookings
Institution, 2018), 214–16.
6
Melnick, The Transformation of Title IX, 214–16.
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Title VII and Title IX: An Interdependent Relationship
There are several factors that have led to the expansion of Title IX to include protection for
transgender students in the school setting. However, considering the similarities between Title VII
and Title IX, many scholars note that officials at all levels of the government often turn to Title
VII executive guidance and judicial decisions to inform the interpretation of Title IX. Although
lawmakers closely modeled Title IX on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin in programs or activities that receive
federal funds, aside from the textual similarities, there are limits to this analogy. Most importantly,
Title IX includes many exemptions that are absent Title VI. 7 For example, Title IX allows for girls
and boys to be separated in certain instances, and it does not affect schools with single-sex
admissions policies or parochial institutions.8 Considering these exceptions, many agree that Title
IX is often more consistent with Title VII in theory and in approach.9 Though Title VII and Title
IX are two distinct statutes that address two distinct contexts, they are similar because both seek
to remedy longstanding discrimination. Despite the obvious differences between schools and the
workplace, the interconnected relationship between the two statutes is most apparent in court cases.
Since the 1989 Supreme Court decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, countless judicial
decisions concerning LGBTQ+ student protections under the law have underscored the textual and
conceptual similarities between Title VII and Title IX when adjudicating Title IX cases. Although
there is a long history of litigation that relied upon legal rationales found in Title VII decisions to
expand Title IX protections, the legal implications of these similarities were heightened in 2020
with the seminal Supreme Court decision Bostock v. Clayton County. The Court ruled in favor of

7
Melnick, The Transformation of Title IX, 40; “Title IX Legal Manual,” The United States Department of Justice,
August 6, 2015, https://www.justice.gov/crt/title-ix; “Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et
seq. § (1964).
8
“Title IX Legal Manual.”
9
“Title IX Legal Manual.”
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the plaintiffs, finding that Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination in the workplace
encompasses discrimination on the basis of both sexual orientation and gender identity. In his
dissenting opinion, Justice Alito warned that the groundbreaking decision is “virtually certain to
have far-reaching consequences.”10 Indeed, the Bostock decision has already had profound
implications for Title IX law and policy, as many scholars predicted it would.
Outside of the judiciary, Melnick expands his theory of “institutional leapfrogging” to
describe the process of “cross-institutional leapfrogging”: the way in which courts and agencies
have extended the scope of Title IX in a number of small steps by claiming to defer to one another’s
policy decisions.11 Beginning in 1975, the courts and the Department of Education’s Office of
Civil Rights (OCR) have relied upon each other’s interpretations of the two statutes to expand the
scope of Title IX to include LGBTQ+ students.12 For instance, the Obama administration’s
controversial 2016 Dear College Letter (DCL) that supported transgender student rights under
Title IX was based upon judicial interpretations of Title IX and Title VII. Melnick highlights how
the Obama administration utilized these interpretations even though the sole pre-2016 Title IX
court case rested on judicial deference to an OCR letter that “…in turn relied on previous Title VII
opinions on quite a different matter.”13 As this complicated example illustrates, the relationship
between Title VII and Title IX judicial decisions has resulted in an intertwined web of case law
that has worked to extend the breadth of each statute over time.
While Melnick’s theory of cross-institutional leapfrogging informs the history of Title IX’s
expansion and emphasizes the relationship between Title VII and Title IX, his analysis is limited

10

Bostock v. Clayton County, No. 90 U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
Melnick, The Transformation of Title IX, 251.
12
Melnick, The Transformation of Title IX, 228-230.
13
Melnick, The Transformation of Title IX, 227 and 253.
11
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because it primarily centers on the role of executive action in creating and implementing Title IX
regulations. Though Melnick writes how “The most important judicial action has taken place in
the lower courts…,” his analysis and much of the current literature on transgender student
protections does not sufficiently emphasize the importance of the judiciary in securing transgender
student rights under the law.14 Although transgender students have been afforded more protection
due to executive regulations or specific state legislative action, transgender students remain
vulnerable given today’s polarized politics. Nevertheless, greater security for transgender student
protections can be found in judicial decisions. In the last thirty years courts across the country have
slowly but steadily addressed transgender rights, reaching conclusions in a surprising trend that
promotes the expansion of Title IX to include protections for LGBTQ+ students.
To understand the crucial role of the judiciary in expanding and securing transgender
student protections, this thesis explores and considers how policies concerning transgender student
rights have been developed by all levels of the government. In Chapter I, recent Title IX executive
action concerning transgender students is examined to document how frequently changing
executive guidelines render transgender student rights under Title IX unstable. Chapter II then
turns to the development of Title VII and Title IX transgender case law in order to explain how
the application of judicial deference enabled transgender students to put forth claims of
discrimination on the basis of sex in the school setting. Chapter III evaluates cases decided after
the Bostock ruling to emphasize its critical impact on Title IX transgender student-specific cases.
By analyzing pivotal cases and their role in propelling transgender student rights, Chapter II and
Chapter III seek to provide a comprehensive overview of the expansion of transgender protections
through the judicial system to emphasize its powerful, yet often unrecognized, role in expanding

14

Melnick, The Transformation of Title IX, 255.
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transgender student rights. Finally, in Chapter IV, the most recent transgender student
controversy—the issue of transgender student athlete participation in sports—is evaluated to reveal
how state legislation has created new uncertainties about the extent to which transgender students’
rights will be protected by Title IX. In underscoring the consistent victories transgender students
have found in the judiciary, especially when compared with those in the executive or legislative
branches, this thesis ultimately argues that the courts are the most successful avenue for advancing
transgender student protections under the law.

10

CHAPTER I
Title IX Executive Action Regarding Transgender Students
Executive branch involvement in interpretating the scope of Title IX has both expanded and
retracted transgender student protections in the last ten years. As with other Title IX regulations,
such as those concerning sexual harassment, changing administrations at the federal level play a
substantial role in directing the extent of transgender student rights under the statute. Considering
the flurry of executive action pertaining to transgender students in recent presidential
administrations, this chapter offers a comprehensive timeline of important executive branch
issuances, orders, and memoranda that have impacted transgender student protections under Title
IX. The controversy surrounding informal policymaking measures in which Title IX regulations
are formulated and implemented will also be considered. In examining executive branch Title IX
transgender student regulations, it is evident that frequently changing Title IX policy guidance
renders transgender student rights unclear and uncertain with each administration.

11

The Expansion and Retraction of Executive Branch Transgender Student Protections
Title IX regulations have grown increasingly complicated in the past forty years as the
executive branch has taken a direct role in dictating how the statute should be interpreted. Trinity
College graduate Cara Bradley reports in her senior Public Policy and Law honors thesis that since
the establishment of the Department of Education (DOE) in 1980, the subsequent seven
presidential administration have each approached Title IX differently, with liberal administrations
strengthening protections and conservative administrations “loosening restrictions and
regulations.”15 Bradley emphasizes how varying presidential ideologies have enabled significant
expansion and retraction of protections since the statute’s enactment in 1972. Not only has this
practice resulted in confusing guidelines on how to approach claims of discrimination under Title
IX, but the frequency of the policy changes has increased as new administrations enter and exit
office. This makes it difficult for schools to remain in compliance with updated regulations and
creates significant fluctuations of protections afforded by Title IX over short periods of time.
Though the executive branch has taken part in directing Title IX’s interpretation since the
1980s, it is only during the last three presidential administrations that transgender student
protections have been addressed. The question of transgender student rights was brought to the
national spotlight during President Obama’s administration-wide effort to extend both Title VII
and Title IX protections to transgender employees and students.16 In April 2014, the Office of Civil
Rights (OCR) issued the document “Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence”
stating that Title IX protects against sexual harassment and violence based on transgender status.17
A year later in 2015, the OCR’s Acting Deputy Assistant for Policy James Ferg-Cadima released

15
Cara Bradley, “Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: An Analysis of The Extent to Which Title IX Has Fulfilled
Its Original Promise of Establishing Gender Equity Between Men and Women in Intercollegiate Athletics”
(Hartford, CT, Trinity College, 2020), 48, https://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/theses/855.
16
Melnick, The Transformation of Title IX, 226.
17
Melnick, The Transformation of Title IX, 228-229.
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a letter declaring that schools must “treat transgender students consistent with their gender
identity” in regard to sex-segregated facilities in schools.18 The OCR and Department of Justice
(DOJ) upheld this position in May 2016 when they issued the controversial Dear Colleague Letter
(DCL), which ruled that educational institutions cannot treat transgender students differently than
their cisgender peers and that transgender students “must be allowed to participate in such
activities and access such facilities consistent with their gender identity.”19 In underscoring that
the prohibition “…encompasses discrimination based on a student’s gender identity, including
discrimination based on a student’s transgender status,” the administration continued to support
the idea that gender identity is equivalent to biological sex in the Title IX context.20 The Obama
administration continued to explain its position on transgender students with the subsequent
publication of “Examples of Policies and Emerging Practices for Supporting Transgender
Students.” The pamphlet, which explained successful transgender policies from various school
districts across the country, was distributed nationwide to educate institutions on how to best
support transgender students in the school setting.21 This additional guidance, along with the initial
2016 DCL, were consistent with the Obama administration’s goal to expand the scope of Title IX
and to educate the general public on the pertinent issues surrounding transgender students.
Though the Obama administration’s issuances provided transgender students with
newfound rights, many critics viewed the development as an attempt to “micromanage”
educational institutions. They also questioned the legitimacy of the guidelines since the proper

18

James Ferg-Cadima, “Letter to Emily Prince from James Ferg-Cadima, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Policy” (U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights, January 7, 2015),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/20150107-title-ix-prince-letter.pdf.
19
Catherine Lhamon and Vanita Gupta, “Dear Colleague Letter on Transgender Students” (U.S. Department of
Justice Civil Rights Division and U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights, May 13, 2016),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201605-title-ix-transgender.pdf.
20
Busch and Thro, Title IX, 211.
21
“Examples of Policies and Emerging Practices for Supporting Transgender Students” (U.S. Department of
Education Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Office of Safe and Healthy Student, May 2016).
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notice-and-comment procedure for enacting new Title IX regulations was not adhered to.22 To
satisfy the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the executive office must
follow the stipulated notice-and-comment process, which allows institutions to preview proposed
guidelines and give feedback when implementing new Title IX regulations.23 Under this
legislation, altering Title IX guidance and regulations should, in theory, be a lengthy and involved
process. However, as the Obama administration’s implementation of its updated Title IX
guidelines demonstrates, this process is not always followed.24
Despite the significant advancement of transgender student rights under President Obama,
these protections were drastically reduced during the Trump administration. In a 2017 DCL from
the Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos, the Department of Education (DOE) rescinded the
Obama administration’s DCL and the letter from James Ferg-Cadima.25 Though DeVos’ DCL
stipulated that the withdrawal of the previous guidance “…does not leave students without
protections from discrimination, bullying, or harassment,” the lack of clear detail regarding the
scope of said “discrimination, bullying, and harassment” made it difficult to ascertain the actual
extent of transgender students’ legal protections under Title IX.26
Over three years later, on May 6, 2020, the Trump administration released its updated Title
IX guidelines in a 554-page document. Following a lengthy notice-and-comment period in which

22
Melnick, The Transformation of Title IX, 226; Jared P. Cole, “Title IX’s Application to Transgender Athletes:
Recent Developments” (Congressional Research Service, August 12, 2020),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=LSB10531.
23
Busch and Thro, Title IX, 78.
24
Michelle E. Philips, “Court Decisions Could Frustrate Obama Administration Efforts to Protect Transgender
Students, Employees,” Jackson Lewis, September 21, 2016, https://www.jacksonlewis.com/publication/courtdecisions-could-frustrate-obama-administration-efforts-protect-transgender-students-employees. Following the
implementation of the Obama administration’s Title IX regulations, many court challenges ensued, notably in North
Carolina and in Texas, which is discussed in greater detail in Chapter III.
25
Sandra Battle and T.E. Wheeler II, “Dear Colleague Letter on Transgender Students” (U.S. Department of Justice
Civil Rights Divison and U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights, February 22, 2017),
http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2017/images/02/23/1atransletterpdf022317.pdf.
26
Battle and Wheeler II, “Dear Colleague Letter on Transgender Students”.
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the DOE received over 124,000 comments, transgender students were scarcely addressed.27
Instead, the Trump administration made highly controversial changes to Title IX’s sexual
harassment policy with little mention of LGBTQ+ students’ ability to use sex-segregated facilities
or participate in sex-segregated activities. The DOE stated bluntly that it declined “…to address
discrimination on the basis of gender identity or other issues raised in the Department's 2015 letter
regarding transgender students' access to facilities such as restrooms and the 2016 ‘Dear Colleague
Letter on Transgender Students.’”

28

Although the Trump administration avoided explicitly

addressing discrimination on the basis of gender identity, it indicated its position on sex
discrimination in schools stating, “Title IX and its implementing regulations include provisions
that presuppose sex as a binary classification.”29 Since the DOE did not “propose to revise” the
scope of sex discrimination in its regulations, the Department automatically defaulted to a
definition of sex as binary, or biological sex at birth.30 Although the Trump administration’s hostile
approach to transgender students created some level of ambiguity, its definition of sex as binary
indicated that it would not protect transgender students from discrimination on the basis of their
gender identity.
Aside from these brief statements, the Trump administration remained silent on the issue
of transgender students for much of its term in office. However, just weeks before President Biden
was sworn in, the DOE released a document on January 8, 2021, clarifying its stance on
transgender students in light of the Bostock decision. In a memorandum question and answer

27

“Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial
Assistance,” 34 CFR 106 § (2020), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/05/19/202010512/nondiscrimination-on-the-basis-of-sex-in-education-programs-or-activities-receiving-federal.
28
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial
Assistance, 2276.
29
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial
Assistance, 2265.
30
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial
Assistance, 2265.
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document, the DOE declared that Bostock does not change the meaning of “sex” as it is used in
Title IX.31 Under this interpretation, the Department explained that bathroom and locker room
facilities and athletics should be separated solely on the basis of biological sex in order to comply
with Title IX.32 Though the DOE recognized that Bostock’s logic might support allegations of sex
discrimination in certain Title IX contexts, it made clear that discrimination on the basis of gender
identity and sexual orientation was not an automatic violation of the statute.33 Throughout the
memorandum, the Department reiterated thirteen times in the thirteen-page document that Bostock
is not applicable to Title IX because the definition of sex in the statute refers to “biological sex”
based on its “ordinary meaning.”34 To support this claim, the document explains how the actual
text of Title IX and Title VII are different and due to these statutory dissimilarities, “…Title IX
and its implementing regulations, unlike Title VII, may require consideration of a person’s
biological sex, male or female.”35 Although the Trump administration suggested that Bostock may
be applicable in certain situations, emphasizing that biological sex is often relevant in the Title IX
context, the memorandum made clear that the use of Bostock to halt discriminatory treatment
toward transgender students was unlikely. In an almost desperate last-ditch attempt leave its mark
on Title IX, the January 2021 memorandum exemplified the Trump administration’s drastic
reduction of transgender student protections.
Yet, within hours of President Trump’s exit from office, the Biden administration wasted
no time overhauling his predecessor’s controversial Title IX guidelines. On January 20, 2021,

31

Reed Rubenstein, “Memorandum for Kimberly M. Richey Acting Assistant Secretary of the Office for Civil
Rights Re: Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020)” (U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights,
January 8, 2021), 2, https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/correspondence/other/ogc-memorandum01082021.pdf.
32
Rubenstein, “Memorandum for Kimberly M. Richey," 7-9.
33
Rubenstein, “Memorandum for Kimberly M. Richey," 4.
34
Rubenstein, “Memorandum for Kimberly M. Richey," 1.
35
Rubenstein, “Memorandum for Kimberly M. Richey," 4.
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President Biden issued Executive Order 13988 Preventing and Combating Discrimination on the
Basis of Gender Identity to extend Bostock’s definition of discrimination on the basis of sex to
Title IX, the Fair Housing Act, and the Immigration and Nationality Act.36 He unequivocally
addressed the issue of transgender students in the second sentence of the document, stating
“Children should be able to learn without worrying about whether they will be denied access to the
restroom, the locker room, or school sports.”37 The fact that Biden issued this order on his first day in
office indicates that expanding protections for transgender students, especially in the most
controversial areas of bathroom access and athletic participation, is of utmost priority for his
administration. Moreover, his explicit reference to Bostock further underlines the decision’s
importance as a catalyst for expanded LGBTQ+ rights in all areas of the law.

While Executive Order 13988 marks a significant turning point in the fight for increased
transgender student protections, the administration did not stop there. On March 8, 2021, President
Biden reiterated his support for transgender students when he issued Executive Order 14021
Guaranteeing an Educational Environment Free From Discrimination on the Basis of Sex,
Including Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity. The order stated that “…it is the policy of my
administration that all students should be guaranteed an education environment free from
discrimination on the basis of sex…including discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or
gender identity.”38 He mandated that within one-hundred days, government agencies “…shall
review all existing regulations, orders, guidance documents, policies, and any other similar agency

36

“Executive Order 13988 Preventing and Combating Discrimination on the Basis of Gender Identity or Sexual
Orientation,” 86 FR 7023 § (2021), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/01/25/2021-01761/preventingand-combating-discrimination-on-the-basis-of-gender-identity-or-sexual-orientation.
37
Exec. Order 13988.
38
“Executive Order 14021 Guaranteeing an Educational Environment Free From Discrimination on the Basis of
Sex, Including Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity,” 86 FR 13803 § (2021),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/03/11/2021-05200/guaranteeing-an-educational-environment-freefrom-discrimination-on-the-basis-of-sex-including.
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actions…that are or may be inconsistent with the policy set forth…[in] this order.”39 Not only did
this statement firmly reinforce his January 2021 Executive Order, it also called upon other
executive agencies to meet the same standards, emphasizing that extending transgender student
protections must be an administrative-wide effort.
Following Biden’s March 2021 Executive Order, a series of agencies issued new
guidelines. Three weeks later on March 26, 2021, the Civil Rights Division of the Department of
Justice issued a document titled “Application of Bostock v. Clayton County to Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972.” The memorandum, directed to all federal agency civil rights
directors and general counsels, instructed that given Executive Order 13988, sex discrimination
prohibited by Title IX includes discrimination on the basis of gender identity and sexual
orientation.40 In addition to citing textual similarities between Title VII and Title IX, the DOJ also
considered recent court cases that have reached the same conclusion.41 Unlike the Trump
administration, the Department deviated from the “ordinary meaning” argument to ultimately
conclude that “…nothing persuasive in the statutory text, legislative history, or caselaw to justify
a departure from Bostock’s textual analysis and the Supreme Court’s longstanding directive to
interpret Title IX’s text broadly.”42
On June 22, 2021, Suzanne Goldberg, the Acting Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights for
the OCR, issued the DOE’s response to Executive Order 14021. In a Notice of Interpretation, she
stated that the Department will interpret Title IX’s protections consistent with the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Bostock. Citing textual similarities and the lower courts’ reliance on Bostock to justify

39

Exec. Order 14021.
Pamela S. Karlan, “Application of Bostock v. Clayton County to Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972”
(U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights, March 26, 2021), 1,
https://www.justice.gov/crt/page/file/1383026/download.
41
Title VII and Title IX transgender court cases are discussed in greater detail in Chapter III.
42
Karlan, “Application of Bostock v. Clayton County to Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,” 3.
40
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the extension of Title IX’s protection to cover gender identity and sexual orientation, Goldberg
concluded “…to the extent other interpretations may exist, this is the best interpretation of the
statute.” This means that moving forward, the OCR will investigate complaints of sex
discrimination based on this definition, thus supporting President Biden’s vigorous effort to extend
transgender student legal protections by applying Title IX guidelines.43 Although the Department
had previously issued a Notice of Language Assistance on April 6, 2021 stating that Trump’s
regulations remained in effect until a proper public hearing and question and answer period could
be held, this document effectively overturned the DOE’s previous statement and firmly placed it
in line with the Biden administration’s position on the matter.44
Only a day later on June 23, 2021, the OCR issued another document affirming the
administration’s support of transgender students. In a “Letter to Educators on Title IX’s 49th
Anniversary,” Goldberg offered an updated Notice of Language Assistance to further reinforce
that the Bostock decision applies “…regardless of whether the individual is an adult in a workplace
or a student in school.”45 She added that the “…OCR will fully enforce Title IX to prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity in education programs and activities
that receive Federal financial assistance”46 In addition to the letter, the DOJ Civil Rights Division
affirmed the DOE’s decree by publishing an updated fact sheet with hypothetical situations that
would require investigation by the OCR under Title IX’s expanded definition of discrimination on
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the basis of sex.47 As the recent rollout of administrative orders demonstrates, there is ardent
support for transgender student protections among the leading agencies that work to ensure
equality in education and in all contexts of an individual’s life. This support from executive
agencies across the board has enabled the Biden administration to advance the most progressive
executive branch transgender student protections yet.
Despite this victory for LGBTQ+ students, the Biden administration’s Title IX regulations
have been met with much resistance. On July 7, 2021, twenty-one conservative state Attorneys
General published a response to the DOE’s June 2021 Notice of Interpretation.48 In the document,
the legal officers openly expressed their opposition to the notice, pointing to three central reasons:
the DOE did not adhere to the public comment process, the interpretation of Title IX set forth does
not take into account privacy issues students may face, and the interpretation encroaches upon
religious liberty. They claimed that as a statutory decision, Bostock cannot override First
Amendment protections.49 The response also notes that in the majority opinion, Justice Gorsuch
explicitly states that Bostock does not automatically apply in the context of Title IX.50 Though the
Biden administration’s application of Bostock to Title IX is commendable, the Attorneys General
raise important policy questions, especially those regarding the complex and often nuanced
stipulations of the participation of transgender student athletes, that have yet to be addressed.
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Executive Action Resistance: State of Tennessee v. United States Dept. of Education
The controversy was further heightened when the State of Tennessee and the nineteen other
states filed a complaint against the Department of Education on August 30, 2021, claiming that
the application of Bostock to Title IX, and Title VII’s interpretation of “sex” in general, is an
attempt to “…rewrite federal law.”51 Turning to the fact that education falls under state authority,
the lawsuit alleges that the “…agencies have no authority to resolve…sensitive questions,” such
as those involving transgender student bathroom access and transgender student athlete
participation in sports, “…let alone to do so by executive fiat without providing any opportunity
for public participation.”52As with complaints concerning Obama’s Title IX regulations, the
lawsuit questions the legality of the Biden administration’s implementation of new Title IX
regulations without adherence to the proper notice and comment process.53
The Attorneys General further maintain that the application of Bostock to Title IX is
unlawful since Justice Gorsuch specifically stated in the opinion that other federal and state
antidiscrimination laws, like Title IX, were not “before” the Court. For this reason, the justices
expressly refused to “’prejudge’” whether the decision would extend beyond Title VII to other
areas of the law.54 Despite the Department of Education’s thorough explanation of the judicial
connection between Title IX and Title VII in the June 2021 Notice of Interpretation, the lawsuit
emphasized that the two statutes are “materially different.”55 Though the states turn to two Sixth
Circuit Court decisions, Meriwether v. Hartop and Pelcha v. MW Bancorp, Inc, to substantiate
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their claim that the statutes’ are dissimilar, the two decisions are taken out of context and do not
directly concern protections for transgender individuals, let alone students, under the law.56
Nonetheless, the Attorneys General persist in explaining that the application of Bostock’s
definition of sex-based discrimination is unlawful because it interferes with established state laws,
such as those that determine athletic participation using birth sex or those that provide students a
right to “’express religious viewpoints in a public school.’”57 In addition to state laws, the
Attorneys General also claim that the Biden administration’s guidelines violate Title IX itself by
undermining the sanctioned sex-segregated facilities, primarily those involving bathrooms and
athletics.58 For these reasons, the states requested declaratory judgment against all documents
issued by Biden administration regarding Title IX, as well as a preliminary and permanent
injunction prohibiting the government from enforcing its updated Title IX regulations.59
Two months later, on October 4, 2021, the Alliance Defending Freedom (ADF) filed a
motion to intervene on behalf three high school cisgender female student athletes from Arkansas.
The ADF argued that the updated guidelines threaten to “erase women’s sports and eliminate the
opportunities for women that Title IX was intended to protect.”60 If granted, the original complaint
would be significantly strengthened as the motion to intervene offers a considerable amount of
evidence that supports the claim that transgender student athlete participation reduces cisgender
female athletes’ opportunities. Yet, as of May 2022, no further litigation has ensued.
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As this complaint demonstrates, there has been much controversy surrounding the Biden
administration’s application of Bostock to Title IX executive regulations. Though the Attorneys
General offer legitimate concerns regarding the notice-and-comment process and the larger issue
of federal and state convergence on educational matters, they fail to acknowledge that many of the
expressed concerns have already been addressed by the courts. Such concerns, like those involving
sex-segregation sanctioned by Title IX, First Amendment protections of free exercise of religion,
and questions of student privacy, have been thoroughly evaluated and considered in recent lower
court decisions across the country.61 Furthermore, the assertion that the texts and purposes of Title
IX and Title VII are dissimilar is an unpopular and largely unsupported view. As discussed in the
Introduction of this paper, courts, scholars, and various executive agencies have long recognized
the relationship between the two statutes despite the fact that there are important differences
between the rules that apply to schools and workplaces.
While the challenges made by the state Attorneys General are dismissive of transgender
student rights, the concerns they raise, especially those regarding procedural processes, echo those
expressed during the Obama administration’s term following its implementation of its Title IX
guidelines without input from the public. Although this method of informal policymaking,
primarily through DCL’s, letters, and notices, has exponentially expanded the statute’s scope over
time to encompass an array of discriminatory treatment in educational settings, this process has
resulted in significant changes with little notice or agreement from institutions and other important
actors. Under the APA, altering Title IX guidance and regulations should theoretically be an
engaged process. Yet, as with both the Obama and Biden Title IX regulations, administrations
often fail to follow to this process. The lack of consistent adherence to APA procedures during the
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Obama, Trump, and Biden presidential administrations reveals the irreconcilables differences
between liberal and conservative policymakers who do not agree upon a single definition of gender
or hold a shared interpretation of Title IX. The Trump administration’s guidelines reflected its
antipathy to the very idea of gender identity itself; a person cannot be transgender because sex
exists as a binary of either male or female. On the other hand, the Biden administration’s policies
emanate from a nuanced understanding of gender as fluid and extending beyond the strict
classification of male or female. The two administrations’ approaches to gender and the law are
mutually exclusive: Trump’s narrow concept of sex cannot coexist with Biden’s broad one, and
vice versa. These fundamental ideological differences concerning gender identify help explain
why changes to Title IX transgender policies have been abrupt, thereby circumventing the
rulemaking process in the last decade. Although many criticize the executive branch’s frequent
failure to adhere to the proper rulemaking process, both the Obama and the Biden administrations
executed new Title IX guidelines swiftly to address to compelling policy needs and the undeniable
danger to transgender students if it failed to act. It is important to emphasize that Biden
administration acted so quickly precisely because the Trump DOE had issued new guidelines,
without a proper review, during the very last days his presidency.
Despite the conflict between proper rulemaking procedures and the Biden administration’s
already-clear stance on transgender student rights, its official updated Title IX guidelines are not
slated to be released until 2022 after the OCR has completed the notice-and-comment period.62
While following the proper policymaking process is important to maintain the legitimacy of Title
IX regulations, the absence of official guidelines from the DOE leaves any litigation many
situations regarding LGBTQ+ student protections up to the lower court’s discretion until that time.
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Conclusion
In a span of only eight years, the interpretation of Title IX at the executive branch level has
undergone drastic changes. As Table 1.1 demonstrates, transgender student rights have undergone
rapid periods of expansion and retraction during each recent administration, rendering their legal
protections ambiguous, inconsistent, and highly contested. The lack of a single authoritative
interpretation of the statute’s scope, coupled with unconventional policymaking measures, has
only heightened this effect. Although the Biden administration has propounded the most
progressive agenda for transgender student rights thus far, there is no guarantee that this level of
legal security will continue in the next administration. As the stark rollback of transgender student
protections by the Trump administration illustrates, if a conservative administration comes into
office, it is likely the current expansive interpretation of Title IX would be reduced once again.
Considering the uncertainty surrounding executive branch Title IX regulations, it is important to
consider another critical avenue in which LGBTQ+ rights, and more recently transgender student
protections, have expanded under the law: the courts.
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Table 1.1 Executive Action Pertaining to Transgender Student
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CHAPTER II
The Evolution of Transgender Student Rights through the Courts: Part 1
The highly public and controversial nature of Title IX administrative guidance often touts
the executive branch as the principal actor in directing the trajectory of LGBTQ+ student
protections. However, though their role has been less recognized, the courts have also played a
crucial part in advancing transgender student protections under the law. To shed light on the
judiciary’s important role in the expansion of transgender student protections, this chapter aims to
explain how statutory and constitutional rights have expanded through judicial decisions to include
transgender students over the last thirty years. In order to best understand the legal rationales that
support transgender student-specific cases, it is important to consider the decisions they are based
upon, which are primarily Title VII cases. Though many of these cases are well-known, their
specific contributions to the development of transgender student case law have not been thoroughly
explained in scholarly literature. Thus, in evaluating how courts built upon previous decisions to
gradually bring transgender rights to the legal stage, the unique role each case played in the
expansion of transgender student rights is articulated.
After establishing the legal basis that enabled transgender students to put forth claims of
discrimination, the earliest transgender student-specific cases are considered to provide important
examples of how courts across the country incorporated and extended Title VII decisions to reach
conclusions within the Title IX context. Starting with the seminal 1989 Title VII case Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins to pioneering transgender student litigation involving the question of
bathroom access in the late 2010s, this chapter will provide a comprehensive outline of cases that
propelled transgender rights to their current legal status.
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Transgender Litigation: The Early Years
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
Before the highly controversial transgender “bathroom issue” gained public attention, many
Title VII cases involving discrimination on the basis of sex made their way through the courts
during the 1980s and 1990s. Though unintentionally, the seminal 1989 case Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins is primarily responsible for laying the legal foundation for later claims of discrimination
made by transgender individuals. When Ann Hopkins, a successful senior manager at a Price
Waterhouse accounting office, was denied partnership at her firm for two years in a row, she sued
the company claiming it discriminated against her on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII.63
The District Court for the District of Columbia agreed with Hopkins and held that she was
discriminated against on the basis of sex because the board took into account comments that were
influenced by sex stereotypes when making its partnership decision.64 The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia affirmed this decision, however they diverged on the issue of liability,
finding that an employer cannot be held liable if it can prove, by clear and convincing evidence,
that it would have made the same decision in the absence of discrimination.65 On appeal, the
Supreme Court reviewed whether the appellate court had erred in finding that an employer must
show clear and convincing evidence to prove that an employment decision was not motivated by
discriminatory intent.
In the plurality opinion issued by Justice Brennan, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of
Appeals’ decision, ruling instead that the right test was used and the burden of proof should have
been placed at “preponderance of the evidence” not the “clear and convincing” standard.66 While
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establishing an employer’s liability for discriminatory intent is less relevant to Title IX due to its
statutory differences from Title VII, in declaring that discrimination on the basis of sex
encompasses gender stereotypes, Justice Brennan articulated a new approach for adjudicating
claims of sex discrimination in the workplace. When explaining the role gender plays in making
employment decisions, Brennan writes that if an employer “…considers both gender and
legitimate factors at the time of making a decision, that decision was ‘because of sex.’”67
Therefore, since Hopkins was penalized for her “masculine” behaviors, which ultimately arose
because of her perceived deviance from expectations about how women should act, she was
discriminated against on the basis of sex. Under this rationale, an employer’s consideration of
other criteria is irrelevant if it otherwise took into account gender stereotypes when making an
employee-related decision since these stereotypes and biases are derived from one’s perceived sex.
The Supreme Court’s declaration that women (and in later cases, men) cannot be punished for their
failure to conform to society’s notions of how they should behave in the workplace established the
“sex-stereotyping” theory of sex discrimination.
Although the Price Waterhouse case did not involve a transgender person, nor does the
decision even mention the LGBTQ+ community, the recognition that employers cannot treat
employees differently because of their gender non-conformity offered a new avenue for those
seeking a legal remedy for gender-based discrimination. While previous definitions of “sex” in
Title VII solely encompassed sex discrimination on the basis of biological sex, incorporating the
broader and less rigid idea of gender stereotypes into the statute’s parameters substantially
expanded its scope. Employees who faced invidious treatment due to their failure to adhere to
societal gender norms could now ground claims of sex discrimination in previously acceptable
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treatment, such as being tasked with carrying out duties traditionally associated with one sex over
the other, gendered remarks, different dress policies for men and women, and other work-related
policies or practices. This newfound protection from adverse gender stereotypes set the strong
precedent that as for the “…legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day when an
employer [can] evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they [match] the stereotype
associated with their group.”68 The Court’s incorporation of sex stereotyping into its analysis
served as an essential launching point for those facing discriminatory treatment based on factors
other than biological sex to seek legal remedy for disparate treatment in the workplace.
Montgomery v. Independent School District
The application of Price Waterhouse’s theory of sex-stereotyping to a Title IX case quickly
followed. Although Price Waterhouse is a Title VII case, it is important to reiterate that courts
often look to Title VII jurisprudence when addressing Title IX claims due the statutes’ similarities
and the ultimate goal of both pieces of legislation to address discrimination. Following the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in the 1996 case Nabozny v. Podlesny, which established that a
school can be held liable under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for
failing to protect homosexual students from harassment, a spate of LGBTQ+ legislation ensued.69
In the 2000 case Montgomery v. Independent School District, the Minnesota District Court
relied directly upon Price Waterhouse to find that a male student’s harassment due to his
“feminine” personality traits was impermissible discrimination under Title IX.70 Jesse
Montgomery was verbally and physically harassed by his classmates based on his perceived sexual
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orientation for approximately eleven years of his education.71 The harassment was so severe and
pervasive that it led to Montgomery’s removal from many of his favorite classes and caused him
to skip many days of school to avoid his harassers. Despite some disciplinary action taken against
the perpetrators, the harassment continued unabated. 72 Montgomery filed suit against the school
district, claiming that its failure to stop the harassment violated his Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection and Due Process rights, as well as Title IX.
In a memorandum opinion, the District Court of Minnesota found Montgomery’s Due
Process rights were not violated because he was still able to take action outside of the school’s
sexual harassment reporting mechanisms through law enforcement or other legal avenues.73 Since
it was evident that the school did not respond to Montgomery’s complaints in the same manner as
they had responded to other claims of harassment, the judge held that Montgomery had stated a
cognizable Equal Protection claim. However, he ultimately found he could not determine if
Montgomery was similarly situated to other students who filed complaints due to the same-sex
nature of his harassment and thus denied the Equal Protection claim.74
Although the Fourteenth Amendment argument proved unsuccessful, some relief was
offered through Title IX. The judge agreed with the school district that Title IX was not applicable
to Montgomery’s claim of sex discrimination because his treatment was not based on sex, but
rather his perceived sexual orientation.75 However given the sexual nature of the verbal and
physical assaults, he held that Montgomery had stated a viable Title IX claim of sex-based
harassment. Relying on the rationale articulated in Price Waterhouse and Onacle v. Sundowner
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Offshore Services, Inc., the Supreme Court decision that ruled that Title VII protects against samesex sexual harassment, the judge found that Montgomery suffered sex-based harassment due to his
failure to conform to masculine gender stereotypes.76 Though this reasoning was later utilized to
substantiate claims of sex discrimination under Title IX rather than claims of harassment, it is
important to note that this was one of the first cases to address this type of anti-gay bullying in a
school setting. Therefore, with little case law to guide the court, it is understandable that portions
of the opinion are slightly misaligned with more recent decisions addressing similar issues.
Nonetheless, by incorporating Price Waterhouse into its discussion, Montgomery played
an important role in bridging the gap between Title VII and Title IX LGBTQ+ litigation. When an
individual is penalized for their transgender status, the animus behind the adverse treatment is their
perceived transgression of traditionally accepted gender norms through their appearance, interests,
or self-identification. Thus, when gender-based harassment or discrimination occurs, it is a
reaction to the incongruence between the individual’s perceived sex and their own self-identity.77
Though Montgomery did not specifically address transgender students, the judge’s declaration that
Title IX—at least in some form—protects against harassment based on gender non-conformity
provided previously unrepresented students the opportunity to make legal claims of discrimination
for the first time.
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Smith v. City of Salem
Price Waterhouse’s theory of sex-stereotyping was further developed when the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals became the first federal appellate court to extend legal protections to a
transgender employee in the 2004 Title VII case Smith v. City of Salem. Lieutenant Jimmie Smith
was terminated from a local fire station due to his “non-masculine” appearance and desire to
undergo a gender transition and present as female.78 Relying on the sex-stereotyping framework,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held in a majority decision that Smith’s termination constituted
sex discrimination under Title VII because it was motivated by his failure to adhere to his
employer’s ideas of proper masculine behavior.79 The opinion found that there was no “…reason
to exclude Title VII coverage for non sex-stereotypical behavior simply because the person is a
transsexual.”80 This forthright declaration relied directly upon Price Waterhouse to reiterate that
transgender status does not preclude an individual from Title VII’s reach if the discriminatory
treatment is based on the individual’s sex. Since the fire department considered Smith’s effeminate
behavior when making the decision to fire him, it had discriminated against Smith in part on his
sex, which is forbidden under Title VII.
Though the defendant’s attempted to utilize Title VII transgender cases from the 1970s and
1980s, such as Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co. and Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., to
emphasize that the statute’s protections do not extend to transgender employees, the court
maintained that “Such analyses cannot be reconciled with Price Waterhouse.”81 This analysis not
only reaffirmed Price Waterhouse as the new standard for claims of sex discrimination under Title
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VII, but it also reiterated that discrimination based on “transsexual” status does not differ from
discrimination on the basis of sex.
Glenn v. Brumby
Legal protections for transgender employees were further expanded in the 2011 case Glenn
v. Brumby. When Vandiver Elizabeth Glenn was diagnosed with Gender Dysmorphia in 2005, she
began taking steps to transition from male to female.82 After Glenn’s senior supervisor Sewell
Brumby learned of her plans to present as a woman, he terminated Glenn claiming that the gender
transition was inappropriate, disruptive, and some employees may find it uncomfortable. Glenn
sued alleging that her dismissal constituted discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment based
on both her sex and her medical condition, Gender Dysmorphia.83 In 2010, the Northern District
Court of Georgia granted summary judgment to Glenn regarding her sex discrimination claim and
granted summary judgment to Brumby regarding Glenn’s medical discrimination claim.84 Both
parties appealed. A three-panel judge majority decision from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
found that discrimination against transgender individuals based on their failure to conform to sexstereotypes constitutes sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.85
Although the facts are similar to Smith, the decision in Glenn is distinct as the court relies
upon the Equal Protection Clause rather than Title VII to reach its decision. The opinion recognized
that had Glenn pursued a claim under Title VII, the evidence provided would have been sufficient
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to prove discriminatory intent.86 However, since she pursed an Equal Protection claim, the court
was obligated to apply a more rigorous legal test to determine if her dismissal constituted sex
discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment.87 Utilizing Price Waterhouse’s theory of sexstereotyping in tandem with previous case law, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the District Court
that heightened scrutiny applied since gender-based classifications are inherently suspect.88 The
panel affirmed the lower court’s decision that Glenn’s termination was motivated by
discriminatory intent, and that Brumby’s concerns were speculative and thus could not stand under
a heightened standard of review. Much like recent Title IX cases involving transgender students,
Brumby’s primary issue with Glenn’s transgender status was his belief that female coworkers
would feel uncomfortable using the same restroom. However, this concern proved to be invalid as
no such complaints had been documented and, most significantly, all the bathrooms in the office
were single stall.89
Building upon the Smith decision, the Eleventh Circuit added that transgender status does
not exclude an individual from the protections afforded by the Equal Protection Clause. Turning
to precedent set by Price Waterhouse, Smith, and a host of other Title VII cases, the court reiterated
the relationship between gender-based discrimination and sex-based discrimination to determine
that “The nature of the discrimination is the same; it may differ in degree but not in kind, and
discrimination on this basis [gender] is a form of sex-based discrimination that is subject to
heightened scrutiny…”90 Based on this analysis, the court reached a conclusion consistent with
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prior rulings: discriminatory treatment cannot prevail when based upon gender- or sex-based
stereotypes.91
The court’s application of the Equal Protection Clause is also significant as this decision
afforded transgender employees, and potentially those outside the legal realm of Title VII, another
approach for seeking relief for disparate treatment. By addressing Glenn’s sex discrimination claim
under the Equal Protection Clause instead of Title VII, the Eleventh Circuit made a powerful
statement: ensuring work environments free from discrimination on the basis of gender nonconformity is so important that it merits constitutional protection. This “coupling” of Title VII
with the Fourteenth Amendment substantially advanced the legal basis for claims of sex
discrimination by providing both a statutory and constitutional avenue for relief. Not only did this
development strengthen the legal foundation of Title VII case law, but it also proved to be crucial
to the expansion of transgender student protections in education.
The Shift to School-Specific Transgender Litigation
During the early years of LGBTQ+ litigation, the expansion of transgender rights primarily
occurred in the Title VII realm. Though these cases did not specifically apply to the school setting,
the case law developed throughout the 2000s and the early 2010s provided transgender students
with a strong legal foundation to base claims of sex discrimination.
Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified School District
In the 2017 case Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified School District, the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals became the first appellate federal court to decisively find that the Title IX prohibition
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of discrimination on the basis of sex extends to transgender students.92 Ash Whitaker, a
transgender male student from Wisconsin, was prohibited from using the boys’ restroom per his
school’s policy that students must use the bathroom that corresponds with their biological sex or
an alternative single-stall gender-neutral option.93 Despite the fact that Ash was diagnosed with
Gender Dysmorphia and identified as male when he began high school in 2013, the school
continued to forbid him from using the boys’ facilities. Fearing that using the gender-neutral
restroom alternative would further single him out and that using the girls’ restroom undermined
his transition, Ash practiced bathroom avoidance or used the boys’ restroom, which resulted in
disciplinary action and threats of surveillance of his bathroom usage.94 Following these
disciplinary measures, Ash filed a complaint in 2016 with the Office of Civil Rights (OCR)
alleging that the school’s policy violated Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. He also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin the enforcement
of the school district’s policy. The school district filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that Ash had
no legitimate claim under Title IX or the Equal Protection Clause. The Eastern District Court of
Wisconsin denied the school’s motion and enjoined the school district from enforcing its policy,
thus allowing Ash to use the boys’ restroom.95
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court ruled in a three-panel judge majority decision that
the District Court did not err in granting a preliminary injunction since Ash’s Title IX and
Fourteenth Amendment claims were likely to succeed on the merits. Looking to Price Waterhouse,
Smith, and Glenn, the Circuit Court interpreted the meaning of “sex discrimination” under Title
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IX consistent with previous Title VII decisions.96 Using Price Waterhouse’s theory of sexstereotyping, the court maintained that Ash had been discriminated against on the basis of sex
because the school’s policy punished him for failing to conform to the accepted gender norms
associated with women. Due to the dissonance between his biological sex and his gender identity,
Ash was subjected to different treatment and sanctions that non-transgender students did not face,
primarily the stipulation that he use single-stall restrooms.97 Therefore, since the policy was
motivated by gender stereotypes that resulted in disparate treatment, it was discriminatory on the
basis of sex, which Title IX prohibits.
In addition to considerably expanding transgender protections within the statutory realm
of Title IX, the Seventh Circuit also addressed the extent of transgender student protections under
the Equal Protection Clause. The school district argued that the policy was necessary to ensure the
protection of students’ privacy. It further maintained that since transgender status is not a protected
class under the Equal Protection Clause, the policy was subject to the rational basis standard of
review.98 Applying this standard, the policy could be found to be rationally related to the goal of
protecting student’s privacy.99 However, as with previous decisions, the Seventh Circuit refuted
this argument, stating that regardless of transgender status, the bathroom policy inherently created
a sex-based classification, which warrants a heightened standard of review.100
Under heightened review, the policy did not stand because it was applied arbitrarily. When
Ash registered for high school in 2013, his birth certificate indicated his sex as female.101 However,
school policy allowed transfer students to enroll using a birth certificate or a passport, which in
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the case of a transgender student, may have been updated to reflect a different sex than at birth.102
For this reason, the policy was not substantially related to the important government interest of
protecting a student’s bodily privacy because it allowed room for error. To further support this
point, the school was unable to provide any documentation of such privacy complaints from
students, prompting the court to find that the purported privacy concerns were merely
speculative.103 The lack of evidence presented by the school district in contrast with the welldocumented harms that Ash faced as a consequence of the policy ultimately led the panel to resolve
that the “mere presence” of a transgender student in the bathroom does not infringe upon the
privacy rights of other students.104 This oftly-cited quote effectively rebuts the conventional
argument that simply being exposed to the opposite sex in a bathroom or locker room constitutes
sexual harassment under Title IX. Though this argument was not considered specifically in
Whitaker, the court’s definitive finding proved to be extremely beneficial in subsequent
transgender student-specific cases. 105
As with its Title IX claim, Whitaker marks the first time a federal court of appeals applied
the Equal Protection Clause to an education case involving a transgender student. Much like Glenn,
the court’s pivotal implementation of the Equal Protection Clause—its “coupling” with Title IX—
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provides transgender students with another legal approach for relief from sex-based
discrimination. Although scholars tend to acknowledge that Title IX and the Equal Protection
Clause offer the most effective approach to relief for transgender students, the interconnected
relationship between the two have not been sufficiently emphasized.106 As with Title VII case law,
the “coupling” phenomenon strengthens the legal foundation for transgender students’ claims of
discrimination by offering both statutory and constitutional avenues for relief. This development
is extremely important in Title IX litigation because frequently changing executive guidelines
often dictate the statute’s scope. However, by grounding claims of sex discrimination in the Equal
Protection Clause, litigation is insulated from changing administrative guidelines. This
constitutional guarantee of protection significantly strengthens legal protections for transgender
students as they are no longer bound by the uncertainty of Title IX regulations from the executive
branch.
Doe v. Boyertown Area School District
As Title IX cases striking down discriminatory policies made their way through the courts
in the 2010s, a concurrent set of cases involving inclusive transgender student policies were also
evaluated. Until 2017, the majority of cases regarding transgender rights came from transgender
students themselves. However, the most recent wave of complaints has been brought by cisgender
students. These cases are important to consider as they address common arguments put forth by
cisgender students who maintain that bathroom facilities separated by biological sex do not violate
Title IX or the Fourteenth Amendment.
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In the 2018 case Doe v. Boyertown, cisgender students complained that the Boyertown
Area School District’s policy allowing students to use the restroom and locker rooms facilities
consistent with their gender identity, regardless of their birth sex, violated their constitutional right
to bodily privacy, Title IX, and Pennsylvania tort law.107 Although the school enacted a careful
screening process to grant access to the facilities consistent with a student’s gender identity and
provided all students who wished for more privacy with single-stall alternatives, four cisgender
students and their families sought preliminary injunction to enjoin the policy based on encounters
with transgender students in the restroom and locker rooms.108 The Eastern District Court of
Pennsylvania denied the injunction on the grounds that the plaintiffs did not face irreparable harm
and that their claims had no likelihood of success on the merits.109 On appeal, the Third Circuit
Court held in a three-panel judge majority opinion that the District Court did not err in their finding,
thus allowing the school district’s policy to stand.
Reviewing the policy under strict scrutiny, the court found that it did not violate the
school’s Fourteenth Amendment privacy interest in protecting an individual’s partially clothed
body. Though a cisgender student’s body may be partially exposed to the opposite sex in the
restroom or locker room, the court held that this does not give rise to a constitutional violation
because the policy was narrowly tailored and served a compelling state interest.110 The court
resolutely declared “…we do not view the level of stress that cisgender students may experience
because of appellees’ bathroom and locker room policy as comparable to the plight transgender
students who are not allowed to use facilities consistent with their gender identity.”111 Therefore,
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while the judges acknowledged that the policy may cause cisgender students to feel distressed, this
discomfort does not outweigh the countless impacts imposed upon transgender students when they
are prohibited from using their preferred facilities.112
Although the appellants attempted to rely upon prior judicial opinions to substantiate their
privacy claim, the court asserted that the decisions in these cases did not recognize a constitutional
mandate for sex-segregated restrooms and locker rooms. Instead, the opinion finds that though the
Constitution “tolerates single-sex accommodations,” it does not “demand it.”113 Without sufficient
legal support, the court disregarded the Fourteenth Amendment privacy claim given that no court
has recognized such an “expansive constitutional right to privacy.”114
The Title IX claim of sexual harassment was also denied since the cisgender students and
their families failed to demonstrate that transgender students in the bathroom or locker room rose
to the level of sexual harassment.115 Relying upon the precedent set in Whitaker, the court ruled
that unless a transgender student is engaging in inappropriate conduct, their mere presence alone
does not constitute sexual harassment under Title IX.116 By building upon Whitaker, the Third
Circuit’s opinion adds to growing case law which maintains that cisgender privacy concerns do
not supersede discriminatory treatment toward transgender students.117

112

Id. at 7 and 17.
Id. at 22. Citing Faulkner v. Jones and Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Center.
114
Id. at 20.
115
Id. at 26.
116
Id. at 28.
117
Finally, in the shortest portion of its opinion, the Third Circuit Court addressed the appellant’s Pennsylvania-tort
law claim. It agreed with the District Court that presence of transgender students in the locker room would not be
considered “highly offensive to a reasonable person” and that the appellants failed to show that the denial of their
injunction would result in irreparable harm. Although this rationale is less thoroughly developed than the other sections
of the opinion, state-specific statutory claims have proven to be successful when argued from either side of the
bathroom debate. Even in early LGBTQ+ litigation, such as in Montgomery and Smith, the courts denied to consider
how transgender individuals facing sex discrimination coincides with state and tort law. This may suggest that tort
law and other state-level statutory measures are not an effective means to achieving expanded transgender or nontransgender protections in regard to the issue of bathroom access.
113

42

Parents for Privacy v. Barr
Two years later the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in the
2020 case Parents for Privacy v. Barr. In addition to finding that a school’s inclusive restroom
and locker room policies do not violate Title IX or cisgender student’s Fourteenth Amendment
rights, the court found these policies also do not infringe upon the First Amendment right to the
free exercise of religion.
In 2015, a transgender student from Oregon asked school officials to use the restroom
consistent with his gender identity. The school district obliged, implementing a “Student Safety
Plan” that allowed any student to use the restroom and locker room consistent with their gender
identity regardless of their biological sex.118 Following the implementation of the policy, some
cisgender boys began to feel “’embarrassment, humiliation, anxiety, intimidation, fear,
apprehension, and stress’” when they had to change their clothes for gym class in the presence of
the opposite biological sex.119 Cisgender girls expressed similar concerns as they feared a
transgender girl would be allowed to use the women’s facilities.120 Despite objections from many
students and parents, the school continued to enforce the policy. In November 2017, a group of
parents and several other individuals sued the school district and various other state and federal
agencies, claiming that the school’s policy violated their Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy,
the Fourteenth Amendment parental right to direct the education of their children, Title IX, and
the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause.121 When the District Court of Oregon dismissed the
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case, finding that the cisgender students had failed to state claims upon which relief could be
granted, the plaintiffs swiftly appealed.122
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held in a three-panel judge majority decision that the District
Court did not err in dismissing the case since the claims were unlikely to succeed on the merits.
Though the facts of the case are similar to Doe v. Boyertown, the legal arguments put forth by the
cisgender students are slightly different and more constitutionally expansive.
The appellants argued that protections under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment encompass a “’…fundamental right to bodily privacy’ that includes ‘a right to privacy
of one’s fully or partially unclothed body…’” However, the court agreed with the Third Circuit
that the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide this explicit protection and that there is no
“…constitutional privacy right to not share restrooms or locker rooms with transgender students
who were assigned a different sex than theirs at birth.”123 As in Doe, the judges also noted that the
cases utilized to support this assertion were not analogous to the situation because they primarily
involved “‘egregious state-compelled intrusions into one’s personal privacy’” between prisoners
and prison guards.124
The court built upon previous decisions to find that the policy also did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment parental right to direct the care, education, and upbringing of their
children.125 Though the panel recognized parents have the ability to decide to enroll or remove
their children from school, this right does not “‘…extend beyond the threshold of the school
door.’”126 Similar to the Due Process argument, the appellants relied upon unrelated First
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Amendment education cases, such as West Virginia v. Barnette and Wisconsin v. Yoder, which do
not support the supposed Fourteenth Amendment parental right “to direct their children’s
upbringing” by dictating school policies127
The appellants further alleged that the school district’s policy violated the First
Amendment Free Exercise Clause by exposing students to an environment that prevented them
from fully adhering to the ideas of modesty their faith prescribes.128 The court found that the policy
did not subvert an individual’s right to freely exercise their religion because it was rationally
related to the legitimate state purpose of providing a safe and welcoming environment for
transgender students. Moreover, since the policy was neutral and did not generally target religious
conduct, it only burdened the exercise of religion incidentally.129
As in Doe, the appellants argued that the policy violated Title IX by turning the restroom
and locker room facilities into sexual harassment inducing environments. Since the only solution
offered to avoid these “hostile environments” was to use single-stall alternatives, the cisgender
students argued the policy was therefore discriminatory on the basis of sex.130 The court rejected
this rationale, explaining that the policy was not discriminatory on the basis of sex because it
applied to all students equally regardless of their sex. To address the sexual harassment claim, the
court reiterated a question that was resolved in previous decisions: the presence of transgender
students alone in locker rooms does not create a hostile environment simply because cisgender
students may be exposed to the opposite biological sex.131
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As the decisions in Doe v. Boyertown and Parents for Privacy v. Barr demonstrate, student
privacy interests do not outweigh the gravity of ensuring transgender students can use facilities
consistent with their gender identity. This growing consensus indicates that the attempt to expand
Fourteenth Amendment protections to encompass a far-reaching bodily privacy right and the
parental right to direct their child’s education is not a successful course of action when addressing
cisgender concerns with inclusive restroom and locker room policies. This assertion is further
supported by the fact that the Supreme Court denied to review both Doe and Parents for Privacy
in 2019 and 2020, respectively, allowing the precedent to remain binding in both the Third and
Ninth Circuit jurisdictions.132 Although it is likely that cases involving student privacy protections
will continue to arise, the concurrence of both the Third and Ninth Court of Appeals, along with
the Supreme Court’s denial to offer their opinion on the matter, suggests that privacy claims and
the role of parents in directing their child’s education are not likely to succeed under the current
set of constitutional or statutory arguments.
Conclusion
Judicial decisions in the past thirty years established a strong set of legal precedents that
enabled transgender students to seek legal remedy for discriminatory treatment in schools. Though
the controversy surrounding transgender students may appear to be a recent policy development
directed by executive action, as this discussion exemplifies, the courts have played an enduring
role in supporting the expansion of transgender student protections. Using the Price Waterhouse
theory of sex-stereotyping, the first court decisions concerning transgender student issues are
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consistent with those of Title VII: denying transgender students access to bathroom facilities
consistent with their gender identity violates Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause. Moreover,
courts seem to be in agreeance that cisgender privacy concerns do not take precedence over
transgender students’ interest in utilizing their preferred restroom facilities. The coupling
“phenomenon” apparent in both Title VII and Title IX litigation further supports the expansion of
legal protections in each area as transgender individuals can seek relief through statutory and
constitutional avenues. This development is especially important for Title IX cases as changing
executive Title IX guidelines often render transgender student protections uncertain. The
subsequent chapter will continue to consider the expansion of transgender student rights in the
context of transgender-student specific litigation, which primarily centers around the contentious
“bathroom debate.”
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CHAPTER III
The Evolution of Transgender Student Rights through the Courts: Part 2
The strong legal foundation established from 1989 to 2020 has enabled transgender
students to ground claims of discrimination in both Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. This chapter continues to explore transgender student-specific litigation
to demonstrate how recent decisions have vigorously affirmed and continued to expand
transgender student protections under the law. Given the contentious nature of the “bathroom
debate,” at present, the majority of cases involving transgender students address the question of
whether transgender students are legally permitted to use bathroom and locker room facilities
consistent with their gender identity. In evaluating important transgender student-specific cases,
this chapter illustrates how transgender student protections have continued their upward trajectory
of expansion through the judiciary. This sustained development can largely be attributed to the
2020 Supreme Court decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, which significantly strengthened the
legal basis for extending transgender rights by proclaiming that sex discrimination under Title VII
encompasses both discrimination on the basis of gender identity and sexual orientation. Therefore,
Bostock’s implications on Title IX litigation will also be examined. In underscoring the victories
transgender students continue to find in the judiciary, this chapter ultimately argues that the courts
may be the most successful avenue for advancing transgender student protections.
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Bostock v. Clayton County: Defining the New Standard for Discrimination on the Basis of
Sex
Gerald Bostock, a child welfare advocate in Clayton County, Georgia, was fired shortly
after he began participating in a gay softball league.133 Despite his outstanding professional record,
he faced criticism after joining the league and was ultimately terminated because of his
“unbecoming” conduct as a county employee.134 Soon after this occurred, Bostock filed suit,
claiming he had been wrongfully dismissed on the basis of his sexual orientation in violation of
Title VII. Two other similar cases, one relating to termination of employment based on gender
identity and the other relating to termination of employment based on sexual orientation, were also
tried in the lower courts, resulting in conflicting rulings. Due to the inconsistent interpretation of
Title VII protections, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the three cases to
address whether Title VII protects LGBTQ+ individuals from employment discrimination.135 The
groundbreaking 6-3 majority opinion delivered by Justice Gorsuch in June 2020 ruled in favor of
the petitioners, finding that Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination in the workplace
encompasses discrimination on the basis of both sexual orientation and gender identity.
According to the decision, in prohibiting discrimination “because of” sex, Title VII calls
for a clear but-for causation standard, which essentially poses the question “but for the existence
of X, would Y have occurred?”136 This means that if one factor or characteristic is changed at a
time and the outcome changes, there is a but-for cause. Though this standard can be sweeping,
Gorsuch assured that the “but-for” cause does not equate to the sole cause and that events can have
multiple “but-for” reasons. Moreover, a protected trait does not need to be the primary factor in an
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employment decision or event to constitute the “but-for” cause.137 Despite these potential
limitations, Bostock make clear that it is impossible to discriminate against a person for being
homosexual or transgender without discriminating against them on the basis of sex because these
factors influenced the disparate treatment, and therefore are the but-for cause.138
Using a simple analogy, Gorsuch explained that if two employees are the same in every
respect except sex and the employer fires the male employee for being attracted to men, it is
discrimination on the basis of sex because it tolerates this characteristic—being attracted to men—
in the female employee.139 Therefore, even if an employer’s goal is to dismiss an employee because
of their gender identity or sexual orientation, it ultimately discriminates on the basis of sex because
“…to achieve that purpose the employer must, along the way, intentionally treat an employee
worse based in part on that individual’s sex.”140 Because Bostock and the other plaintiffs were
penalized for being attracted to the same sex and exhibiting behaviors typically associated with
the other gender, Gorsuch held that the employees’ terminations constitute discrimination on the
basis of sex in violation of Title VII.
In response to the argument that at the time of Title VII’s passage in 1964 Congress did
not intend its protections to extend to homosexual and transgender individuals, Gorsuch reiterated
that legislative history holds little merit because “…when Congress chooses not to include any
exceptions to a broad rule, courts apply the broad rule.” He thus applied the “broad rule” by
adopting an expansive definition of “sex” under Title VII.141 Despite other arguments put forth by
the defendants, no matter which way the situation is approached, an employer necessarily
137
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discriminates based on sex when it considers homosexuality or transgender status in making
employee-related decisions because “…the first cannot happen without the second.”142
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, expressed his disdain for
the majority decision, calling it an attempt to “‘…update’ old statutes so that they better reflect the
current values of society.”143 Contrary to Justice Gorsuch, he contended that Congress’ failure to
amend Title VII or enact new legislation that specifically protects individuals against
discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender sufficiently underlines that Title VII’s scope
should not be expanded.144 He further added that since sex, as likely understood by those in 1964
and in conversation today, means biological differences, the majority opinion is invalid.145 Not
only has the Supreme Court denounced the reliance on dictionary definitions when interpreting
statues, Alito’s reasoning fails to grapple with the central point of the majority opinion. Gorsuch
does not attempt to redefine the meaning of sex by stating sexual orientation and gender identity
are impermissible grounds of discrimination under Title VII. Instead, he asserts that because sex
plays a role in defining sexual orientation and gender identity, discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation and gender identity is inherently discrimination based on sex.
Despite Alito’s misguided reliance on the historical and present-day understanding of sex,
he warns that the decision is “…virtually certain to have far-reaching consequences.”146 In
describing these potential impacts, Alito points to two unique issues in education: “Bathrooms,
locker rooms, [and other things] of [that] kind…” and “Women’s sports.”147 Evidentially, Alito
was aware of the sweeping consequences Bostock would have on legal proceedings in the school
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context. Nonetheless, the concerns expressed by Alito underscore the significance of Gorsuch’s
opinion: it not only expands upon Price to definitively prohibit discrimination based on sexual
orientation and gender identity in the workplace, but it also provides LGBTQ+ students with an
even stronger legal basis to ground claims of sex discrimination.
Post-Bostock Transgender Student Litigation
Adams v. School Board of St. Johns County, Florida
The 2020 case Adams v. School Board of St. Johns County, Florida, presented the first
post-Bostock opportunity to interpret the definition of sex under Title IX. Drew Adams, a
transgender male high school student, was barred from using the restroom consistent with his
gender identity under the St. John’s County School Board’s policy which stated that transgender
students must use gender-neutral restrooms or the restroom corresponding to their biological sex
at school.148 Adams brought suit against the school board, claiming that the policy violated his
rights under Title IX and the Fourteenth Amendment.149 Despite the fact that Adams was clinically
diagnosed with Gender Dysphoria and had socially, medically, and legally transitioned, he was
still prohibited from using the boys’ restroom at school. After the District Court for the Middle
District Court of Florida ruled in favor of Adams, the case was sent to the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals de novo to review whether the school’s policy violated Title IX and the Equal
Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment.
In a 2-1 decision, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s finding that the school’s
policy violated both Title IX and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.150 Since the
policy involved a sex-based classification, the court utilized a heightened standard of review to
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evaluate Adam’s Equal Protection claim.151 It found that the policy failed to support a substantially
important governmental interest because it was administered arbitrarily.152 Similar to Whitaker v.
Kenosha, the school district used documents submitted when students first enrolled in the school
system to determine their sex. However, it is possible that a transgender student may have enrolled
in school after already having transitioned. Therefore, had Adams enrolled in school using his
updated legal documents, the school board would have no claim against him.153 For this reason,
the court maintained that the school board cannot contend it was truly interested in protecting
students’ privacy because the policy did not effectively bar all transgender students from using
their preferred restroom.154
This argument was further supported by the fact that the school provided no evidence of
such student privacy concerns. Under the heightened standard of judicial review, a “genuine” and
“not hypothesized” justification must be supported with concrete evidence to prove the necessity
of a discriminatory policy or law. Though the school board alleged that cisgender males felt
uncomfortable with Adams in the boys’ restroom, it failed to present any documentation
supporting this claim. Therefore, without specific evidence, the court found that the school board
did not meet its burden to show a genuine justification for excluding Adams from the boys’
restroom. 155 For these reasons, the policy violated Adams’ Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of
Equal Protection under the law.156
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The panel also ruled the policy was discriminatory on the basis of sex in violation of Title
IX.157 Relying heavily on Bostock, the court concluded that “sex” in Title IX encompasses gender
identity in the same manner as it does in Title VII.158 In applying the “but-for” causation standard,
the court found that if Adams’ birth sex was male, he would have been allowed to use the boys’
restroom.159 Changing his birth sex to female changed the outcome of the situation, thus sex was
the “but-for” cause. Turning to Glenn, the court further explained that the policy subjected Adams
to discriminatory treatment because it “punished” him, by requiring he use single-stall facilities,
for defying social and gender stereotypes of how a biological female should act.160
In addressing an argument similar to that made by the defense in Bostock, the court refuted
the idea that Congress in 1972 did not intend for Title IX protections to encompass transgender
students, writing, “Bostock teaches that, even if Congress never contemplated that Title VII could
forbid discrimination against transgender people, the ‘starkly broad terms’ of the statute require
nothing less.”161 Like Title VII, there is no implicit evidence in Title IX’s plain language that “sex”
refers to biological sex. Moreover, there is no indication in the statute’s regulations that “…declare
which sex should determine a transgender student’s restroom use,” thus leaving much room for
interpretation.162 The Eleventh Circuit’s Title IX conclusion serves as an important turning point
in transgender student litigation because it marks the first appellate court to declare that
exclusionary transgender bathroom policies cannot prevail under Bostock’s expanded definition of
discrimination on the basis of sex.

157

Id. at 31.
Id. at 42.
159
Id. at 36.
160
Id. at 12.
161
Id. at 33.
162
Id. at 41.
158

54

In his dissenting opinion, the-now Chief Judge Pryor argued that the policy does not
discriminate on the basis of sex because it relies upon sex-segregated facilities, which are
permissible under Title IX.163 In his view, the opinion calls into question the constitutionality of
sex-segregated facilities themselves to reach “…the remarkable conclusion that schoolchildren
have no sex-specific privacy interests when using the bathroom.”164 Considering the fact that the
school presented no concrete evidence that any student expressed this concern, Judge Pryor’s
argument seems deficient.
Moreover, nowhere in the opinion do the judges suggest sex-segregated facilities must be
completely abolished. Instead the majority reiterates, “…the constitutionality of gender-separated
bathrooms is not before us… no one has argued here that separating men and women’s restrooms
treats men and women unequally, lacks any factual basis, or perpetuates ‘invidious, archaic, and
overbroad stereotypes’ about gender.”165 Pryor’s continued assertion that the majority opinion
permits the eradication of sex-segregated facilities is unsubstantiated, and he conflates sex- and
transgender-based classifications to completely distort the school board’s policy.
In addressing the Equal Protection claim, Pryor maintained that the policy survived
heightened scrutiny because it served the interest of protecting students from being exposed to the
opposite sex.166 He attempted to demonstrate that the policy was substantially related to this
interest by drawing upon data from the student population. Out of the 40,000 students in the school
district, officials were aware of sixteen transgender students when the case was heard. By doing a
simple mathematical equation, Judge Pryor calculated that the policy was 99.96% accurate in
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properly separating bathrooms by sex. This “near perfect result” proved that the policy was
substantially related to the school’s interest in protecting student privacy.167
While this percentage may be accurate (it does not account for transgender students that
school board is unaware of), this reasoning completely undermines Title IX’s primary objective:
to provide an educational experience free from discriminatory treatment on the basis of sex.
Though the policy may only affect a small population of St. Johns County students, in refusing to
provide accommodations for transgender individuals, the school board willing tolerated inflicting
harm and hardship upon its students. Though Judge Pryor is correct that the Supreme Court held
that Bostock does not automatically apply to other areas of the law, his failure to truly consider the
implications of the decision, as well as his complete disregard for the precedence established in
previous cases, like Glenn and Whitaker, significantly weakens his argument.
Regardless of Judge Pryor’s dissent, the Adams decision is pivotal as it effectively relies
upon the precedent set in in Bostock’s to uphold transgender student protections under Title IX
and the Equal Protection Clause. In light of a pending motion for reconsideration of the case by
the entire Eleventh Circuit in June 2021, the three-judge panel that originally issued the decision
vacated the ruling and issued a new opinion that reached similar, but more narrow conclusions.
The amended opinion finds that the school board’s policy for designating a student’s sex upon
enrollment violates the Fourteenth Amendment due to its arbitrary nature.168 Interestingly, the
judges declined to reach the Title IX issue given that the Equal Protection Claim grants Adams
full relief.169 The revised opinion also dedicates considerable attention to addressing Judge Pryor’s
dissent. Citing Craig v. Boren and other cases, the judges held that Judge Pryor’s reliance on
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statistics to determine the soundness of the school’s policy was unsettling as the “The relevant
inquiry in this case is not what percentage of St. Johns’ students are transgender, but whether the
challenged policy furthers the important goal of student privacy.”170
Despite its narrower scope, the July 2021 decision continues to uphold transgender student
protections by ruling that the school’s policy violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Regardless of
Bostock and the overwhelming support for inclusive transgender restroom polices among federal
appellate courts, the school board submitted a request for rehearing by the full Eleventh Circuit in
August 2021.171 The case was reheard on February 22, 2022 by a 12-judge court, but as of May
2022, no decision has been released.172 Though a different outcome is possible, given Bostock’s
precedent and the consensus among the circuit courts regarding transgender protections under the
law, it is unlikely the Adams decision will be significantly altered.
Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board
Only a few weeks later, the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning was further substantiated by the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in the seminal case Grimm v. Gloucester County School
Board. Following his gender transition, Gavin Grimm a transgender male student, was prohibited
from using the boys’ restroom beginning his sophomore year of high school.173 Although Grimm
used the boys’ restrooms for seven weeks without issue, when the school board began receiving
complaints from the community, it adopted a new policy that students must use the restrooms
consistent with their “biological gender” and those with “gender identity issues” could use single-
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stall gender-neutral alternatives.174 Grimm found the policy’s single-stall stipulation to be isolating
and stigmatizing, which led him to practice “restroom avoidance” and caused him to develop
serious mental health issues.175
Grimm sued the school board in 2015 on the grounds that preventing him from using the
boys’ restroom violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and constituted
sex discrimination under Title IX. The Eastern District Court of Virginia denied Grimm’s motion
for preliminary injunction, stating it would not defer to the Obama administration’s Dear
Colleague Letter (DCL) requiring that transgender students be treated consistent with their gender
identity.176 In 2016, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s decision,
holding that Grimm must be allowed to use the boys’ restroom.177 Despite this victory for
LGBTQ+ students, marking the first time a federal court of appeals ruled on the issue of
transgender restroom access, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit for
reconsideration in light of the Trump administration’s withdrawal of the Obama administration’s
Title IX guidance in February 2017.178
In 2017, during his senior year of high school, Grimm received an updated birth certificate
from the state of Virginia confirming his male sex. When he asked school administrators to amend
his records to reflect this change, they refused, claiming the birth certificate was invalid.179 Grimm
filed an amended complaint, alleging that in addition to violating Title IX, the school’s refusal to
update his records to match his gender identity also violated the Equal Protection Clause.

174

Grimm v. Gloucester at 16.
Id. at 20.
176
Id. at 22.
177
Id. at 24.
178
Id. at 23.
179
Id. at 21.
175

58

Following two more years of litigation in the lower courts, the case came before the Fourth Circuit
once again in 2020 for review.
Following its second rehearing, the Fourth Circuit Court ultimately ruled in Grimm’s favor,
reaching a conclusion similar to its 2016 ruling: the school board’s policy prohibiting transgender
students from using restrooms consistent with their gender identity and refusing to amend school
records violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and constitutes sexbased discrimination under Title IX.180
After establishing that Grimm’s claim could not be thrown out on an administrative
technicality, the court held in a 2-1 decision that the school board’s policy violated the Equal
Protection Clause because it was not “substantially related to a sufficiently important
governmental interest.”181 Under a heightened standard of review, the court held that the policy
did not stand.182 Not only had Grimm used the boys’ restroom for seven weeks without incident,
but also the “…[b]odily privacy of cisgender boys…did not increase when Grimm was banned
from those restrooms.”183 As with many other cases concerning the bathroom debate, the school
board failed to marshal any concrete evidence to support the alleged student privacy concerns.184
Although Parents for Privacy v. Barr and Doe v. Boyertown provide evidence of these allegations,
as stated in these decisions, privacy concerns do not outweigh the harms imposed upon transgender
students who are denied the right to use the facilities consistent with their gender identity.
Therefore, the policy constituted sex-based discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause because it treated Grimm differently than other boys and also penalized him for failing to
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conform to gender stereotypes.185 Although the Seventh Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit reached
similar conclusions in Whitaker and Adams, respectively, the Fourth Circuit utilized Bostock to
address the Fourteenth Amendment claim. 186 In applying Bostock, a statutory decision, to the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Fourth Circuit introduced another complementary legal rationale for
adjudicating claims of sex discrimination in schools under the Constitution. The application of
Bostock not only strengthens the relationship between Title VII and Title IX case law, but it also
reinforces the connection between statutory protections and constitutional protections in the school
context.
In reviewing Grimm’s Title IX claim, the court again applied Bostock’s definition of “sex.”
Following the same logic as their Fourteenth Amendment reasoning, it held that even if the school
board intended to discriminate against Grimm’s gender identity, it could not do so without
referencing his sex. Therefore, the policy was discriminatory on the basis of sex because sex was
the ultimate but-for cause for the board’s actions.187
The dissenting opinion issued by Judge Niemeyer restates many of the arguments put forth
in the Adams dissent. Niemeyer maintains that the policy was not discriminatory because it created
distinctions based on sex permissible by Title IX.188 In regard to the Equal Protection claim, he
believes Grimm was not discriminated against since his female birth sex situated him differently
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than his biologically male peers.189 However, much like Chief Justice Pryor, Judge Niemeyer
failed to view transgender status as legitimate and overlooked the true focus of the majority’s
arguments.
Despite those who claim exclusionary transgender bathroom policies are not
discriminatory, another win came for Grimm and LGBTQ+ students across the nation in June 2021
when the Supreme Court denied the school board’s writ of certiorari, thereby reinforcing the
Fourth Circuit’s decision as binding.190 As the decisions in Adams and Grimm emphasize,
Bostock’s expanded definition of sex discrimination has not only been crucial for securing
LGBTQ+ rights within the workplace, but in education, as well. Though transgender student rights
have primarily experienced increased protections through court decisions in the past thirty years,
it is important to note that there are a handful of contradictory decisions that rule against extending
legal protections to transgender students.
Anti-Transgender Litigation in Education
Johnston v. University of Pittsburgh
In the 2015 case Johnston v. University of Pittsburgh, the Western District Court of
Pennsylvania found that the University of Pittsburgh’s policy that prohibited transgender students
from using the restrooms and locker rooms consistent with their gender identity did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title IX, and other state statutes designed
to protect against discrimination.191 When Seamus Johnston, a transgender male student, enrolled
in the University of Pittsburgh in 2009, he listed his sex as “female” since his legal documents did
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not yet reflect his gender identity. Although Johnston had used the boys’ restroom and locker room
facilities, as well as had taken a men-only weight training class during his first two years of college,
in 2011 he was informed he could not use the male facilities until he presented an updated birth
certificate.192 Despite this warning, Johnston continued use the male facilities, which resulted in
many disciplinary measures and sanctions, and eventually expulsion from the college, as well as a
criminal charge for “indecent exposure, criminal trespass, and disorderly conduct.”193 In 2013,
Johnston filed a four-count complaint against the University. The University subsequently filed a
motion to dismiss.194
In a memorandum opinion, the District Court denied all four claims, finding that the
University’s policy was not discriminatory.195 Although Johnston argued that he was treated
differently from similarly situated students, the court held that he failed to state a cognizable claim
under the Equal Protection Clause. Since “transgender” is not a suspect class, it reviewed the policy
using the rational basis standard.196 Under this standard, the court found that the University’s
policy advanced its interest in “…providing its students with a safe and comfortable environment
for performing…life functions.”197 In short, the court ruled that protecting non-transgender
students’ privacy outweighed transgender students’ ability to use facilities that correspond with
their gender identity.
The court further opined that decisions such as Smith v. City of Salem and Glenn v. Brumby
were not applicable because they did not “…treat transgender status, in and of itself, as a suspect
classification,” and since Johnston did not allege a gender stereotyping claim under the Price
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theory, his Equal Protection rights were not violated.198 Turning to cases from the 1980s, the court
held that Johnston did not experience discrimination on the basis of sex under 1984 case Ulane v.
E. Airlines, Inc which defines sex as the biological sex at birth.199 Despite the fact that numerous
cases prior to 2015 recognized Price as the standard for adjudicating claims of sex discrimination
under Title VII and Title IX, the court asserted that since “…neither the Supreme Court nor the
Third Circuit has addressed the precise issue, this Court will follow the definition embraced by
Ulane and its progeny.”200 Given the fact that the Third Circuit ruled on this “precise issue” only
three years later, it is unlikely the District Court would reach the same conclusion in the present
day.
Nonetheless, the court continued with this line of reasoning when addressing Johnston’s
claim that the policy was discriminatory under Title IX because it discriminated against him on
his transgender status and gender nonconformity. Relying on the “plain language” of the statute
and the dictionary definition of sex, the court concluded that Title IX does not prohibit
discrimination on the basis of gender identity.201 Claiming there was little Title IX judicial
guidance on the issue, the court differed to Title VII cases, where it found no court had explicitly
ruled that Title VII protections encompass transgender status. In the court’s view, cases like Smith,
“…did not conclude that ‘transgender’ is a protected class under Title VII, but only that a male or
female who is also transgender can assert a sex stereotyping claim under Title VII for adverse
employment actions.”202 Once again, the court looked to outdated judicial decisions to conclude
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sex discrimination did not encompass transgender status, and therefore the University’s policy did
not discriminate on the basis of sex.203
In addressing Johnston’s sex-stereotyping claim, the court relied on Third Circuit cases
that misconstrue Price to protect against harassment based on sex, not discrimination on the basis
of sex.204 Based on this analysis, it found that in order to state a cognizable sex-stereotyping claim,
“…a plaintiff must allege that he did not conform to his harasser’s vision of how a man should
look, speak, and act.”205 Therefore, since the University only relied on sex as a classifying factor
to prohibit Johnston from using the bathrooms and locker rooms consistent with his gender
identity, it did not violate Title IX by discriminating against him for the way he “looked, acted, or
spoke.”206 The court did not reach Johnston’s state-law claims because he failed to allege a
plausible federal claim for relief under the Equal Protection Clause or Title IX.207 Eventually, the
case was settled in 2016 under the University’s newly-appointed associate vice chancellor for
diversity and inclusion who vowed to “…ensure that all students have an on-campus experience
that is inclusive and respectful of students’ rights, including their gender identity…”208
Though the Johnston opinion worked against the expansion of transgender student rights,
at the time of its adjudication there was not a definitive judicial stance on the issue of transgender
student bathroom access. Considering that the case was settled and subsequent decisions rule in
favor of transgender student protections, the District Court’s narrow approach in interpretating
related Title VII cases has since been invalidated.
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Texas v. United States
In a related 2016 case, Texas v. United States, the Northern District Court of Texas reached
a similar conclusion. Following the Obama administration’s enactment of its Title IX guidance on
transgender students in 2016, thirteen states and agencies along with two school districts sued the
Department of Education, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and other
federal agencies.209 The plaintiffs claimed that requiring schools to allow transgender students to
use facilities that correspond with their gender identity is unlawful because “sex” was defined as
the biological differences between men and women when Congress enacted Title VII and Title
IX.210 Although the court accepted this argument, under Bostock it is unlikely this rationale would
succeed since the decision makes clear that legislative intent is not an acceptable basis for defining
protections under the law.
Nonetheless, because the Obama administration did not adhere to the proper notice-andcomment process outlined by the Administrative Procedure Act, the district judge found that the
state agencies were not required to grant deference to the guidance.211 In declaring that the states
were not required to adopt the Obama administration’s Title IX regulations, the court ultimately
concluded that Title IX and Title VII do not prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender
identity.212 Although this decision worked against the expansion of transgender rights under both
Title IX and Title VII, upon the Trump administration’s recission of the Obama administration’s
Title IX guidance in February 2017, the plaintiffs withdrew their complaint and the case never
reached the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for review.213
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While the facts of this case do not involve any specific school district or its policies, during
the roughly seven-month period the decision applied, claims of discrimination on the basis of
gender nonconformity under Title VII and Title IX were no longer valid in many jurisdictions
across the nation. The hostility exhibited toward the expansion of transgender protections through
executive guidance underlines the importance of securing protections outside of the Title IX realm
in order to safeguard transgender students from reactionary responses to changing administrative
guidelines. Though this decision allowed for discriminatory treatment toward LGBTQ+
individuals to be tolerated, in light of the case’s withdrawal and the most recent transgender
litigation, the decision no longer carries much legal weight.
Although the courts’ decisions in Johnston and Texas and in other similar cases denied
protections to transgender students, following Whitaker, and certainly Bostock, much of the
reasoning presented in these opinions are no longer valid under the expanded definition of sex.
Thus, while these cases are important to consider in order to understand the extent of the
transgender rights across the country, subsequent rulings render these opinions less significant.
Conclusion: The Power of the Courts
The overall success of advancing transgender rights through the judiciary suggests that the
courts may be the most successful avenue for expanding transgender rights under the law. By
building upon previous decisions to gradually extend the scope of Title VII, Title IX, and the Equal
Protection Clause, transgender individuals now have a strong legal foundation for addressing
claims of sex discrimination in both the workplace and the school setting. Table 1.2 provides an
overview of the cases discussed in this chapter and Chapter II and their unique roles in expanding
transgender protections.
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The importance of Bostock v. Clayton County in ensuring these protections must be
underscored. While it is likely that federal appellate courts would have continued to uphold
transgender student protections under Price Waterhouse’s theory of sex-stereotyping, as in cases
such as Whitaker v. Kenosha, the Bostock decision firmly establishes the precedent that students
cannot be discriminated against on the basis of their transgender status. Not only does this
declaration effectively overturn anti-transgender decisions, like those in Johnston v. University of
Pittsburgh or Texas v. United States, but it also sends the strong message that school policies and
practices denying transgender students access to facilities consistent with their gender identity are
unlawful, as demonstrated in in Adams v. School Board of St. Johns County and Grimm v.
Gloucester.
Though many remain opposed to Bostock’s far-reaching legal consequences, the decision
is not as radical as some may perceive it to be. As the long legal history explained in this chapter
and the previous one demonstrates, in many ways, the Supreme Court simply reaffirmed what
numerous lower courts had maintained for years. Though the Biden administration’s executive
orders mandating the application of Bostock to Title IX raises questions of constitutionality, a
court’s decision to integrate Bostock into Title IX cases involving sex discrimination is not out of
the ordinary. As Table 1.2, which appears on page 70, shows, the reliance upon Title VII decisions
to expand transgender student protections has occurred for over twenty years. Though individuals
and state officials may question the executive branch’s integration of Bostock into its Title IX and
Title VII guidance, it is much more challenging to dispute the principle of judicial deference.
For this reason, it is imperative to continue to advance transgender student rights through
the courts. While the executive branch contributes to directing transgender protections under the
law, the turbulent nature of administrative guidance can also be extremely detrimental. Within the
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last ten years, Title IX transgender protections have taken many shapes. From inclusive policies
under the Obama administration, to relatively no legal standing under the Trump administration,
and most recently, robust protections under President Biden’s direction, it is clear that changing
policies in presidential administrations have subjected Title IX transgender protections to great
uncertainty. Although the executive branch has generally favored transgender student protections,
as the Trump administration’s stark rollback of almost all LGBTQ+ student rights illustrate,
transgender student protection under Title IX is not guaranteed.
Unlike administrative guidance, however, state and federal court decisions are particularly
beneficial for securing transgender student protections because they are insulated from changing
administrations and are much more tedious to overturn than executive guidance. Though it is likely
cases involving exclusionary transgender policies will continue to arise, Bostock, along with the
growing case law supporting transgender students, indicates that the contentious bathroom debate
may have been put to rest.
This assertion is further supported by the introduction of the Equal Protection Clause to
Title IX cases. Although the majority of the courts in this chapter did not rely solely upon Title IX
regulations when reaching its decision, a handful of cases grappled with the temporal and often
contradictory nature of executive Title IX guidance. Most prominently, Grimm v. Gloucester was
remanded to the Fourth Circuit due to changing Title IX regulations. In Parents for Privacy v. Barr
and Adams v. St Johns County, the decisions also note that the withdrawal of Title IX documents
present a potential issue.214 Evidentially, changing Title IX guidelines is not only harmful for
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transgender student protections, but as Texas v. United States demonstrates, also raises questions
of constitutionality.
Considering the complicated problem of judicial deference to executive Title IX
regulations, the introduction of the Equal Protection Clause presents transgender students with a
sound legal basis for staking claims of sex discrimination despite changing Title IX guidelines.
Pulling transgender student protections out of statutory law means these students are no longer
confined to the parameters set forth by changing presidential administrations. While this is still an
emerging area of Title IX litigation, the growing reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment to support
transgender student litigation suggests these rights could be definitively secured in schools despite
what the executive branch dictates. It is likely that this legal foundation will inform the most recent
issue facing transgender students: participation in athletics. Unlike the bathroom debate, there has
been less conclusive guidance on transgender athletes from the executive branch and courts alike.
However, the strong legal foundation established to address the bathroom controversy is hopeful
evidence that the trend toward transgender equity will continue in school sports.

We are unpersuaded. The 2017 letter contained no substantive interpretation of the meaning of ‘sex discrimination’
in Title IX. It merely withdrew the 2016 guidance for lack of sufficient legal explanation and formal process.”
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Table 1.2 The Relationship Between Title VII and Title IX Jurisprudence

CHAPTER IV
The Future of Transgender Student Litigation: Athletics
While the bathroom debate is now more or less settled, addressing how transgender
students fit into the athletic realm is a much more challenging task. Despite resounding judicial
support for inclusive transgender student bathroom policies, the transgender athlete debate
emphasizes how athletic policies are markedly different than restroom policies and thus require
independent consideration.215 Recent interpretations of Title IX allow for two equally valid claims
of discrimination to be made by both cisgender and transgender students. Those who oppose
transgender athletes, particularly transgender females, argue that the biological differences
between men and women give transgender females an unfair competitive advantage over cisgender
athletes, thus reducing opportunities for success for female athletes in violation of Title IX.
However, others view policies barring transgender athletes from participating on the team
consistent with their gender identity as discriminatory on the basis of sex under the Bostock
decision. The delicate balance between creating an inclusive and equitable athletic environment
for transgender students while still protecting and promoting equal opportunities in sports for
female athletes lies at the heart of the issue.
This chapter will explore the growing number of transgender student athlete cases to
ascertain the judiciary’s current stance on the legal questions. Relying upon established
transgender student case law, it will also consider potential limitations in applying the rationale
expounded in transgender student bathroom cases to those regarding athletic participation. Though
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transgender student athlete cases are still in their earliest stages of litigation, recent memorandum
opinions and orders suggest that the courts will play a substantial role in guiding the development
of legal protections for transgender student athletes. Taking into account state polices that restrict
transgender students’ ability to participate in sports as well as changing administrative guidelines,
this chapter aims to support the overarching argument that the courts are best suited to expand
transgender student rights under the law.
Executive Branch Involvement
The debate surrounding transgender student athlete participation in sports is a relatively
new development in cases involving transgender rights. Unlike the bathroom debate that spans
over the last twenty years, awareness of transgender student athletes and subsequent litigation
arose in the 2010s following a series of executive orders and notices.
In 2015, James A. Ferg-Cadima, Obama’s Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy,
wrote in his “Letter to Emily Prince” that schools “…generally must treat transgender students
consistent with their gender identity.”216 Though he was mostly referring to sex-segregated
restroom and locker room facilities, the letter raised questions about how transgender student
athletes would fit into Title IX-sanctioned sex-segregated sports. The Obama administration’s
stance on the matter was confirmed in its 2016 Dear Colleague Letter (DCL) which stated that
schools must treat “…a student’s gender identity as the student’s sex for purposes of Title IX and
its implementing regulations. This means that a school must not treat a transgender student
differently from the way it treats other students of the same gender identity.”217 Despite the
stipulation that schools must treat transgender students consistent with their gender identity, the
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DCL specifically stated that Title IX “…does not prohibit age-appropriate, tailored requirements
based on sound, current, and research-based medical knowledge about the impact of the students’
participation on the competitive fairness or physical safety of the sport.”218 Though the Obama
administration was enthusiastically supportive of inclusive transgender student policies in general,
this statement created a level of ambiguity concerning the types of student athlete policies
permissible under Title IX during his presidency. The fact that the DCL attempted to promote
transgender inclusion in schools, while simultaneously failing to offer clear guidance on athletics,
exemplifies the difficulty of creating inclusionary transgender polices while still respecting a
central goal of Title IX: promoting equality for a traditionally under-supported group—female
athletes.219
The Obama administration’s liberal approach to Title IX transgender regulations
drastically shifted when President Trump came into office. Due to the discontinuities regarding
the interpretation of sex in Title IX between the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Grimm v.
Gloucester and the federal district court in Texas in Texas v. United States, the administration
withdrew Obama’s guidance in February 2017 using a Dear Colleague Letter.220 Though the DCL
insisted that “All schools must ensure that all students, including LGBT students, are able to learn
and thrive in a safe environment,” the lack of clear guidelines on how to accomplish this goal made
it difficult to interpret Title IX and how it applied, if at all, to transgender students.
Over three years later in May 2020, the Trump administration finally released its updated
Title IX guidelines in a 554-page document titled “Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in
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Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance.”221 As mentioned
previously, the document implemented highly controversial changes to Title IX’s sexual
harassment policy but made little mention of how the administration would address LGBTQ+
students. In regard to transgender student athletes specifically, the document asserted “These final
regulations concern sexual harassment and not the participation of individuals, including
transgender individuals, in sports or other competitive activities,” underlining a consistent theme
throughout Trump administration of refusing to confront transgender youths.222
Just over a year after the implementation of the Trump administration’s Title IX guidance,
in March 2021, President Biden completely reversed his predecessor’s polices. Biden announced
in Executive Order 14021 that his administration’s understanding of Title IX discrimination on the
basis of sex includes both sexual orientation and gender identity.223 Three months later in June
2021, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) affirmed Biden’s order stating that in light of the Bostock
decision, it would enforce Title IX to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and
gender identity in all educational programs that receive federal dollars.224 Though the notice of
interpretation does not mention transgender athletes specifically, it does recognize that
discriminatory treatment includes polices that enable students to be “…excluded from, denied
equal access to, or subjected to sex stereotyping in academic or extracurricular opportunities and
other education programs or activities…”225 This suggests that the provision applies in equal force
to transgender student athletes. While the Biden administration’s official Title IX regulations will
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not be released until 2022, it is likely that they will continue to build upon the current documents
and support the expansion of transgender student rights in athletics.226 This view is supported by
the Biden administration’s filing of amici briefs in important transgender student right cases, such
as Adams v. School Board of St. John’s County and B.P.J. v. West Virginia.227
As with the debate surrounding transgender student bathroom access, the past three
presidential administrations have advanced vastly different Title IX protections for transgender
student athletes. As argued previously, the fluctuating nature of administrative Title IX guidance
subjects transgender student athlete protections to great uncertainty. The question of transgender
student athlete eligibility carries another level of complexity as several states have subverted the
current administration’s position on the issue through legislative measures that outwardly prohibit
transgender student athletes from participating on sports teams consistent with their gender
identity. Unlike the bathroom debate, however, these policies have been enacted on the state level
rather than the local level, which undoubtedly impacts a much larger population of students.
Backed by the power and legitimacy of a legislative body rather than the small-scale policymaking
measures of school boards, these pieces of legislation raise significant alarm for transgender
student athletes across the country.
Anti-Trans Athlete Legislation
States are at odds with one another about how to address transgender student athletes; some
legislatures are expanding protections for transgender student athletes, while many more are
restricting the rights of transgender students at the outset. In March 2020, Idaho became the first
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state to categorically bar transgender female athletes from participating in women’s sports with
the passage of the Fairness in Women’s Sports Act. Following Idaho’s lead, eleven additional
states passed legislation to prohibit transgender student athletes from participating on the sports
team that corresponds with their gender identity.228 On the other hand, fifteen states and
Washington D.C. have specific laws that protect transgender students from discrimination by
allowing them to participate in sports consistent with their gender identity.229 Yet, in addition to
the current twelve states that have exclusionary transgender athlete laws, there are a number of
other state legislature across the country working to enact their own version of Idaho’s ban.
2021 was a record-breaking year for anti-transgender student athlete legislation.230 Despite
the fact that there is little to no scientific evidence behind these polices, by the end of the 2021
legislative session, over 94 pieces of legislation had been introduced in thirty-six state legislatures
across the country.231 This trend continues to persist. As of May 2022, there are currently over
forty proposed bills pending in twenty-five different state legislatures that aim to bar transgender
students, especially transgender females, from participating in women’s sports.232 Though these
bills primarily originate in conservative states, state legislatures with proposed anti-trans bills
include liberal-leaning states like Rhode Island and Illinois.233
The divided state legislative landscape creates many obstacles for transgender student
athletes. Without federal legislative guidance on the matter, legal protections for transgender
athletes depends primarily on where students live and go to school. This not only precipitates
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inequitable treatment, but it also creates a disjointed legal landscape that is challenging to navigate
on the national level. Moreover, states with exclusionary policies contradict both the Bostock
decision and the Biden administration’s stance on the matter. The discord on the issue of
transgender student athletes between the Supreme Court, the current presidential administration,
and state legislatures underscores the need for clear judicial review and guidance on how to best
address legal protections for transgender student athletes.
Considering anti-trans legislative proposals, as well as changing executive guidelines, as
with the bathroom debate, it is important to turn to the courts to provide more stable guidance on
how to address transgender student athlete protections. Though transgender athlete cases are still
in their earliest stages of litigation, the decisions and orders issued by courts around the country
thus far provide a window into how transgender student athlete protections may change through
judicial intervention in the near future.
Current Litigation
Unlike the multiple settled cases involving transgender students’ access to restroom
facilities consistent with their gender identity, there are currently no transgender student athlete
cases that have reached a definitive decision. More importantly, in the three most legally robust
pending cases, courts have refrained from addressing the constitutionality of transgender student
athlete participation in sports, instead opting to take a more neutral approach by deciding cases on
technicalities. Nonetheless, these cases are important to examine as they are working to build the
foundation for future discussions and are indicative of the direction the courts may take on the
issue.
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Soule v. Connecticut Association et al.
As one of the most highly publicized transgender student cases, Soule v. Connecticut et al.
greatly propelled the issue of transgender student athlete participation in sports to the national
stage. In February 2020, Selina Soule and Chelsea Mitchell, then high school seniors, and Alanna
Smith and Ashley Nicoletti, then high school sophomores, sought a preliminary injunction against
the Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference’s (CIAC) policy that permits transgender
students to compete in sports consistent with their gender identity without hormone treatment or
surgical procedures.234 Soule and her peers alleged that without an injunction, they would continue
to face unfair competition due to the participation of two transgender female athletes, Andraya
Yearwood and Terry Miller, then high school seniors.235 Prior to seeking an injunction, the
plaintiffs filed a federal Title IX complaint with the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) claiming that
Yearwood and Miller limited cisgender female athletes’ success on the girls’ track and field team
due to their purported physical advantages. However, following an investigation, the OCR took no
action against the two transgender athletes.236
Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction was
unable to be heard and their request for an expediated trial was denied on the grounds that the 2020
track season was likely to be canceled.237 Upon resuming litigation, however, both Soule and
Mitchell had graduated from high school and were no longer eligible to compete in CIACsponsored events.238
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The District Court of Connecticut considered whether the plaintiffs maintained standing in
obtaining the requested injunction against CIAC’s policy following Soule and Mitchell’s
graduation. In an April 2021 order, a district judge held that the two other plaintiffs, Smith and
Nicoletti, who were still eligible to compete in high school track as high school juniors, lacked
standing because they failed to identify a transgender student who was likely to compete against
them in the upcoming track season.239
To address the question of standing, the court turned to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals’ “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception. In order to apply the exception and
effectively maintain standing, the “injury’s reoccurrence,” which in this case is the participation
of another transgender female athlete on the girls’ track and field team, must be “‘reasonably
likely” and not “…at best, only a theoretical and speculative possibility.’”240 Since Smith and
Nicoletti were unable to identify any transgender female athletes who would compete against them
in the 2021 track and field season, the judge declared their case was moot. It is important to note,
however, that while this ruling allows CIAC’s inclusive transgender student athlete policy to stand,
it does not prevent students from filing a new action should a similar situation arise again241
The plaintiffs also requested an injunction to alter the records of the races Yearwood and
Miller competed in by removing their scores from the final results to move every other female
participant up one position.242 This too, lacked validity because the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the
“redressability element of standing.”243 Under this principle, it must be likely, not merely
speculative, that a favorable judicial decision would sufficiently rectify the alleged misconduct.
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The judge determined, however, that if the court amended the records, it would not significantly
address the supposed injuries faced by the cisgender female runners.244 As explained in the order,
Chelsea Miller is the only student to whom this argument applies since eliminating Yearwood and
Miller from the records would allow her to add four additional wins to her résumé.245 However,
the judge found this argument unpersuasive as “…it seems inevitable that before making an offer
to Mitchell, a prospective employer impressed by her record would learn that she did not actually
finish first in the four races…even with the requested changes, Mitchell’s position with regard to
her employment prospects would remain essentially the same.”246
Finally, the order held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to monetary damages because
per Title IX’s regulatory measures the defendants, Yearwood and Miller, did not receive adequate
notice that they were liable for the conduct in question.247 Although the Trump administration
withdrew Obama’s Title IX guidelines in February 2017, according to the District Court, the
Obama guidelines remained in effect until the Trump administration issued its update Title IX
regulations, which it did not so until February 2020.248 Yearwood and Miller were not informed
of the OCR’s new interpretation of Title IX, one that declared that sex-segregated sports teams
must be separated by biological sex, until May 2020, several months after the action was brought
against them. Moreover, the Trump administration’s guidelines were withdrawn in February 2021,
thus rendering its guidance invalid when the District Court reviewed the case.249
The complicated role that the OCR guidance plays in this case underscores the argument
presented throughout this thesis that relying upon the OCR and presidential administrations to
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provide concrete and stable guidelines for transgender students is inadequate for securing
transgender student protections under the law. As the judge’s discussion of the OCR’s changing
stance highlights, in a span of only four years, transgender students went from having full
protection under Title IX to no protection at all.
Despite the judge’s reaffirmation of transgender student athletes’ ability to participate in
sports consistent with their gender identity, the plaintiffs filed an appeal with the Second Circuit
Court in July 2021 hoping to reverse the lower court’s order.250 No further litigation has occurred
since. As with other transgender athlete cases, the court’s decision focuses on technicalities and
fails to grapple with the larger constitutional question of the scope of Title IX and Fourteenth
Amendment protections. Though the Bostock decision was in effect for nearly a year when this
case was last adjudicated, the judge overlooked its influence, writing in a footnote that “The parties
dispute the significance of Bostock for cases arising under Title IX’s prohibition of sex
discrimination. But there is no need to get into that dispute now.” 251 The failure to apply Bostock’s
principles indicates the need for additional guidance on the matter, which hopefully the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals will provide in a timely manner.
Hecox v. Little
Following the passage of Idaho’s Fairness in Women’s Sports Act, Lindsay Hecox along
with another teenage student, referred to as Jane Doe, filed a motion for preliminary injunction to
enjoin the policy, claiming it violates Title IX and the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal
protection.252 The law contains three primary provisions. First, any public school or institution in
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Idaho whose students compete against other public schools and institutions must designate sports
teams as either male, female, or coed on the basis of “biological sex.” It also states that athletic
teams designated as “female” are not open to students of the male sex. However, since no
comparable provision is provided for sports teams designated as “male,” cisgender females or
transgender male athletes could play on the boys’ teams without issue.253
Second, the bill creates a “dispute process” for any individual who wishes to contest the
sex of a transgender or cisgender female athletes. To resolve a dispute, female athletes must
provide a health examination or other statement signed by their personal health care provider to
confirm their female sex.254 As with the first provision, there is no dispute process in place for
those who wish to question the legitimacy of a male athlete’s sex since the law does not restrict
students’ participation on men’s teams.255
Finally, to ensure compliance, the law outlines an enforcement mechanism that creates a
private cause of action for any individual negatively impacted by a violation of the statue.256 From
the time of its introduction to the legislature, both the current and former state Attorney Generals
cautioned that the law proscribed disparate treatment on the basis of sex in violation of the
Constitution.257 Regardless of these concerns, as well as the impending Covid-19 pandemic that
forced governments across the world to shut down, Governor Little signed the controversial bill
into law on March 30, 2020.258
Lindsey Hecox is a transgender female student athlete at Boise State University in Idaho.
As a lifelong runner, she intended to try out for the Boise State women’s cross-country and track
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teams during the 2020-2021 school year. Under the current National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA) rules, Hecox is eligible to participate with her cisgender peers after one year
of hormone suppressing treatment, which she has completed.259 Jane Doe is a seventeen-year-old
cisgender female student athlete at Boise High School who worries that under the new law, her
“masculine” appearance and characteristics will provoke her competitors to challenge her
“biological sex.”260 In response to their motion for preliminary injunction, Governor Little, the
Idaho Superintendent of Public Instruction, and a handful of other state actors, filed a motion to
dismiss, alleging that Hecox and Doe’s claims lacked standing and were not ripe for review.261 An
additional group of two cisgender female collegiate athletes, Madi and MK, filed a concurrent
motion to intervene after having “deflating experiences” competing against a transgender female
athlete in 2019 at the University of Montana.262 Though the larger question at hand involves the
constitutionality of the Fairness in Women’s Sports Act and whether it violates Title IX and the
Fourteenth Amendment, at present, the Idaho District Court has only addressed the three separate
motions.263
As the proceedings demonstrate, Hecox v. Little is a complicated case that involves
multiple actors with varying interests in defending or disputing the Fairness in Women’s Sport’s
Act. Considering the complexity of the case, which is still in its earliest and most technical stage
of litigation, the discussion of the case focuses on the aspects that are most related to the
transgender student athlete debate.
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In August 2020, the Chief Judge of the District of Idaho issued a memorandum opinion
and order granting Hecox and Doe’s motion for preliminary injunction, granting the motion to
intervene, and granting in part and denying in part the defendant’s motion to dismiss.264
Addressing the motion to intervene to determine the parties of the case, the judge held that Madi
and MK, the two cisgender female athletes, have a protected interest in ensuring the equality of
athletic opportunity. Citing the original intent and premise of Title IX as it has applied to athletics
for the last fifty years, the opinion found that protecting cisgender female athletes’ access to
athletic opportunity is “…unquestionably a legitimate and important interest.”265 By granting the
motion to intervene, the decision incorporates the perspective of cisgender athletes whose concerns
mirror those of the plaintiff’s in Soule. This suggests that cisgender student concerns are legitimate
and may play a larger role in litigation than they have in cases involving transgender student
bathroom access. Though Madi and MK are collegiate athletes who are still subjected to the
NCAA’s regulations, which permit transgender female athletes to participate on women’s teams
after a year of hormone treatment, even if a challenged law only partially protects an intervenor
from harm it “…does not mean that the intervenor does not have an interest in preserving that
partial protection.”266 In recognizing this interest, Madi and MK joined the defendants in defending
the Idaho law.
The decision then turned to the defendant’s request for a motion to dismiss. The defendants
argue that Hecox and Doe lack standing because they failed to allege that they have suffered an
injury in fact and there is no guarantee that the law will be enforced against them.267 They reached
this conclusion by reasoning that Hecox cannot be subjected to exclusionary treatment and Doe

264

Id. at 1.
Id. at 18.
266
Id. at 19.
267
Id. at 32 and 38.
265

84

cannot be subjected to verify her sex until each athlete makes a women’s sports team.268 The judge
found this rationale unpersuasive for many reasons.
As it pertains to Hecox, the law is discriminatory because it prevents her from trying out
for the women’s teams all together.269 Although, as the state emphasizes, the law has yet to be
enforced against her, the Supreme Court has long held that equal protection constitutes “…denial
of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of a barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain
the benefit.”270 Since the law prohibits Hecox from trying out in the first place, thus subjecting
her to unequal treatment, Hecox adequately alleged an injury.271 Moreover, the civil liability faced
by schools that permit transgender female athletes to compete means the law’s enactment is
“…essentially guaranteed,” which will inevitably cause harm Hecox in the future.272
As pertains to Doe, it is clear that the law subjects her to different and less favorable
treatment based on her sex.273 Male athletes who play on men’s teams do not face the risk of having
their sex disputed. This creates a disparity based on sex since similarly situated female athletes are
subjected to different treatment than similarly situated male athletes—a clear violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.274 Though Doe’s sex has not been challenged, this does not change the
fact that the law imposes different treatment for female athletes. The decision adds that “If the
Court withholds its decision, both Plaintiffs risk being forced to endure a humiliating dispute
process and/or invasive medical examination simply to play sports,” further underlining the
injustice the law supports.275 Considering this, the judge rejected the defendant’s claim that the
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plaintiffs have no standing, denying this part of their requested motion to dismiss. However, the
defendant’s assertion that Hecox and Doe have only alleged an as-applied challenge to the law was
upheld because its provisions can be applied constitutionally.276 This means that instead of
challenging the act “facially,” or in all possible applications, further litigation will only consider
how the particular application of the law in these circumstances violates Title IX or the Fourteenth
Amendment.277
Building upon the rationale discussed when reviewing the motion to dismiss, the District
Court granted Hecox and Doe’s motion for preliminary injunction, holding that under intermediate
scrutiny their case is likely to succeed in proving the law is unconstitutional as it discriminates on
the basis of transgender status and on the basis of sex.278 Rather than promoting a general
separation between male athletes and female athletes, the law not only excludes transgender
student athletes, a historically disadvantaged group, from participating in women’s sports, but it
also further discriminates against cisgender women by subjecting them to the sex dispute
process.279
The defendants contend the law is constitutional under the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Clark
ex rel. Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Association, which found that there are legitimate reasons
for prohibiting males from participating on female sports teams. However, the court underlined
that this case is dissimilar as it involves the question of sex-segregated sports teams, which is not
central to the case at hand. Moreover, the decision finds that maintaining sex-segregated teams
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does “…not appear to be implicated by allowing transgender women to participate on women’s
teams.”280
The defendants then allege that the law is necessary to fulfill the state’s interest in
promoting “sex equality” by providing opportunities for female athletes to demonstrate their skills
and obtain scholarships and other awards.281 While Hecox and Doe do not debate the importance
of these governmental interests, the law does not sufficiently relate to this goal. As demonstrated
by the legislative history of the bill, no evidence was provided to establish that transgender
females’ participation in women’s sports displaced cisgender athletes or that such exclusionary
legal measures are necessary to promote “sex equality.”282 Furthermore, the defendant’s allegation
that transgender females hold an “absolute advantage” over their cisgender peers, despite hormone
suppressing treatment, is an overbroad generalization that is not based in fact.283 This claim is not
supported by expert medical knowledge and it does not reflect the policies of other elite athletic
regulatory bodies, such as the NCAA and the International Olympic Committee (IOC).284
Based on this evidence, the court concluded that the law is not substantially related to the
goal of protecting equal athletic opportunities for female athletes.285 In fact, as with many cases
concerning the transgender student bathroom debate, the law presents a loophole that undermines
sex-specific teams all together. If Hecox’s health care provider were to verify her sex as female,
which her counsel confirmed that she would, Hecox would be allowed to compete on the women’s
team without issue.286 Thus, the true intent behind the law cannot be to promote equal athletic
opportunities for female athletes by maintaining sex-segregated sports teams. Instead, as the court
280
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explains, the legislation serves as an avenue for the Idaho legislature to express its disdain for
transgender individuals.287 Since animus is never an “exceedingly persuasive” justification for
discriminatory treatment, nor is unnecessary invasive medical examinations to verify a female
athlete’s sex, Hecox and Doe’s preliminary injunction was granted finding that they are both likely
to succeed on the merits.288
The court issued a prohibitory injunction to preserve the status quo while awaiting trial on
the merits.289 Prior to the Fairness in Women’s Sport’s Act, the Idaho High School Activities
Association (IHSAA), the primary interscholastic regulatory association in Idaho, allowed K-12
transgender female student athletes to participate on girls’ teams after completing one year of
hormone therapy to suppress testosterone for the purpose of gender transition.290 In granting the
prohibitory injunction, these standards are in effect in the state of Idaho until the litigation of this
case concludes.
Following the Idaho District Court’s decision to temporarily enjoin the law, the defendant’s
filed an appeal with the Ninth Circuit Court in November 2020 claiming that the lower court erred
in its decision. Before continuing litigation, however, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the
District Court in June 2021 to determine if Hecox’s claim was moot in light of her changed
enrollment status.291 During the 2021-2022 school year, Hecox took a leave of absence and was
not a full-time student at Boise State University, which called into question her eligibility to
compete. Four months later in October 2021, the lower court determined that Hecox is still eligible
to compete in the NCAA league and that she plans to reenroll in Boise State for the Spring 2022
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semester.292 Since providing the Ninth Circuit with updated facts of the case, no further litigation
has ensued. Although the law remains enjoined, until the appellate court offers its opinion on the
matter, the future of the case is unclear.
B.P.J. v. West Virginia State Board of Education
Similar to Hecox, B.P.J. v. West Virginia Board of Education addresses a West Virginia
law that prohibits transgender student athletes’ participation on a sports team that corresponds with
their gender identity. During the 2021 legislative session, the West Virginia state legislature passed
the Protect Women’s Sports Act which, like Hecox, requires that any sports team sponsored by a
public secondary school or higher education institution be designated as either male, female, or
coed. The law defines “male” and “female” as an individual’s “biological sex determined at
birth.”293
In light of this legislation, B.P.J., an eleven-year-old transgender female student in West
Virginia, was denied from joining her middle-school’s girls’ cross-country and track teams.294
Regardless of the fact that B.P.J has presented as female since the third grade and began hormone
therapy to prevent male puberty following her diagnosis of gender dysmorphia in 2019, she was
barred from participating on teams consistent with her gender identity when she entered middle
school in the fall of 2021.295 In response, B.P.J.’s mother filed a complaint and a subsequent motion
for a preliminary injunction against the West Virginia Board of Education, the Harrison County
Board of Education, and other state actors and regulatory agencies, alleging that denying her
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daughter from participating on the girls’ cross-country and track teams violates Title IX and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.296
In July 2021, a West Virginia District Court judge issued a memorandum opinion and order
granting B.P.J.’s motion to preliminarily enjoin the Protect Women’s Sports Act on the grounds
that she has a likelihood of success in demonstrating that the statute is unconstitutional and violates
Title IX.297 Regarding the Title IX claim, the opinion cites the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Grimm
v. Gloucester and Bostock v. Clayton County to support its conclusion that the statute is
discriminatory on the basis of sex because it cannot be explained without referencing a student’s
biological sex.298 Therefore, B.P.J.’s sex, as in other transgender cases that utilize Bostock’s logic,
is the but-for cause of her exclusion from the girls’ sports teams. The opinion further explains that
the law harms B.P.J. for many of the same reasons articulated in earlier transgender bathroom
cases, such as feelings of isolation and stigmatization regarding her transgender status.299 The use
of the Bostock in the early stages of litigation is a departure from Hecox, which declined to
incorporate the seminal decision in its opinion. Relying upon Bostock to substantiate transgender
individuals’ struggles outside the workplace reinforces the assertion that the judiciary continues to
be a successful avenue for expanding transgender student rights, as well as strengthens B.P.J.’s
case by supporting her claims with a Supreme Court decision.
The opinion then turns to the alleged Fourteenth Amendment violation. Using a familiar
line of reasoning, West Virginia asserts that its policy is not discriminatory because it is premised
on “biological sex” and does not treat B.P.J. differently than similarly situated biological males.300
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However, relying heavily on the Grimm v. Gloucester decision, the court refuted this rationale,
declaring that B.P.J. is “…not most similarly situated with cisgender boys; she is similarly situated
to other girls.”301 Therefore, the law violates the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal
protection because B.P.J. is the only who girl who is prohibited to participate in girls’ athletics.
The decision further explains that since the law discriminates on the basis of transgender
status, a quasi-suspect class, it is subject to heightened scrutiny.302 Considering that B.P.J.’s
hormone treatment prevents endogenous puberty, as well as the fact that cross-country and track
and field are non-contact sports, the court ruled that the law is not substantially related to the state’s
goal of protecting female athletes’ safety since B.P.J. does not pose any significant physical threat
to her cisgender peers.303 Moreover, given that only a very small percentage of the population are
transgender athletes, the state’s claim that the law intends to ensure equal athletic opportunities for
female athletes is also invalid.304
Based on this reasoning, the court enjoined West Virginia’s policy, thus allowing B.P.J. to
participate on the girls’ sports teams. While granting the injunction is a win for B.P.J. and signals
growing judicial support for inclusive or partially inclusive transgender student athlete policies,
there are two important implications to consider. First, as with Hecox, the preliminary injunction
is as-applied, meaning other transgender students in West Virginia who wish to participate in
athletics consistent with their gender identity can still be prohibited from doing so.305 Second, as
in previous decisions, the opinion does not offer insight on the constitutionality of the matter;
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instead, it leaves the question—whether the law is “facially unconstitutional”—to later stages of
litigation.306
Despite these shortcomings, the District Court continued to uphold the enjoinment of the
West Virginia law when it denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the case in December 2021.307
Since the law does not include a specific mandate that the West Virginia Secondary Schools
Activities Commission (WVSSAC), the state-wide student athlete regulatory body, enforce the
law against her, the defendants claimed that B.P.J. lacks standing because no harm has occurred.308
The Harrison County Board of Education added that it would not enforce the law against B.P.J.
either.309 The court found this argument unconvincing. After determining that the court still holds
subject matter jurisdiction over the issue, it ruled that litigation can continue because B.P.J.’s
claims do not require any further factual development; the law prevents her from participating on
girls’ sports teams, and “…no future factual development will change that effect.”310 Taking this
into account along with the already-stated facts of the case, the defendant’s motion to dismiss was
denied, confirming B.P.J.’s allegation that the Protect Women’s Sports Act constitutes
discriminatory treatment on the basis of sex in violation of Title IX and the Equal Protection
Clause.311 Though this decision is a positive step toward securing transgender student athlete rights
in the state of West Virginia, as of May 2022 both parties filed motions for summary judgment,
indicating that further litigation, which could potentially be harmful to transgender student athlete
rights, will ensue.312
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In the early stages of litigation, the ultimate outcome of the three cases presented remains
unclear. Yet, in granting preliminary injunctions that either block anti-transgender student athlete
laws, as in Hecox v. Little and B.P.J. v. West Virginia, or affirm policies that permit transgender
student athletes to compete, as in Soule v. Connecticut Association et al., it appears that courts will
support favorable outcomes for transgender student athletes as litigation proceeds. However, since
the current set of transgender student athlete cases were decided on technicalities, without specific
attention given to the larger constitutional issue at hand, their ultimate outcome remains uncertain.
While this uncertainty is unsettling for transgender students who are most directly affected
by these policies, it is important to note that from the outset of transgender student bathroom
litigation, cases were often decided on technicalities, too. Though litigation is currently focusing
on the technical aspects of transgender student athlete cases, it does not mean the decisions are
ineffectual. In other words, as with the bathroom debate, these decisions are paving the way to
enable greater discussions of constitutionality while simultaneously working to build case law that
specifically pertains to transgender student athletes.
Conclusion: What’s Next for Transgender Student Athletes?
The cases discussed in this chapter contribute to the burgeoning transgender student case
law by defending the expansion of transgender student athlete protections under both Title IX and
the Equal Protection Clause. Unlike early cases involving transgender student bathroom access,
the “coupling” effect of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause is already in effect as transgender
student athletes continue to put forth both constitutional and statutory claims of discrimination.
This strategy is likely influenced by the successful judicial history of securing transgender
bathroom rights. “Coupling” Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause in these foundational cases
supports the argument that transgender student case law is evolving into its own legal entity.
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Having a strong legal basis in transgender student-specific cases supports the expansion of
transgender athlete protections because it enables courts to draw upon legal reasonings specific to
the transgender experience to support their opinions. This makes it more difficult for opponents to
challenge the judiciary’s use of non-Title IX decisions to substantiate claims of discrimination.
The fact that three district courts from different states across the country (Connecticut, Idaho, and
West Virginia) ruled in favor of transgender student athletes regarding both Title IX and Equal
Protection Clause protections suggests that if the judiciary continues the trend of ruling in favor of
transgender individuals, it is likely that transgender student athlete rights will also become more
secure through court action. Yet, until an appellate court opines on the matter, the outcome of
future cases is still uncertain.
Scholars and activists on both sides of the legal debate who advance transgender rights or
seek to protect women’s athletic opportunities, remain divided on the issue. Some believe that
inclusive and partially-inclusive policies—policies that require some form of hormone therapy for
a duration of time before female transgender athletes can participate on women’s sports teams—
are constitutional and support the underlying objectives of Title IX.313 Many note, too, that since
these policies are consistent with other elite athletic regulatory organizations, such as the NCAA
and the IOC, they should become the standard.314 Others, like the cisgender individuals in the cases
discussed, see restrictive policies that rely upon birth sex to determine a student’s sports team as
the only answer. Much to the dismay of countless advocates who believe that Title IX is necessary
to ensure equal opportunity in women’s sports, some scholars radically argue that gendered sports
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and the statute itself should be completely abolished.315 Most scholars can agree, however, that
Congress should amend Title IX to provide more clarity about the extent of the statute’s scope.316
Yet, this would arguably be an incredibly challenging feat given today’s polarized political
climate.317 As these varied policy proposals demonstrate, there is a certain degree of dissatisfaction
surrounding the current status of transgender students athletes and an overall lack of consensus on
how to best address their eligibility while still maintaining a level playing field for cisgender
female athletes.
As state legislatures continue to enact laws that prohibit the participation of transgender
student athletes and executive guidance changes from administration to administration, judicial
input regarding transgender student athlete protections under the law is much needed. While
litigation does not rapidly expand LGBTQ+ protections, the courts have been the most consistent
protector of transgender rights in the past twenty years and will most likely continue to be on this
transgender student issue, as well.
Though the current rulings in transgender student athlete cases are positive, these decisions
represent only a small portion of the complex legal landscape for transgender students across the
country. Further research is necessary to explore litigation beyond the limited scope of the cases
analyzed in this chapter as state legislatures continue to propose legislation that not only raise
questions of constitutionality, but also work to make transgender youths’ lives exceedingly
difficult. Recent examples include the governor of Texas’ March 2022 order to investigate genderaffirming health care for transgender youths as child abuse and a proposed Florida policy—the
“Don’t Say Gay”—bill that would prohibit the “instruction” or “discussion” of sexual orientation
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in schools.318 Though the courts’ progress on transgender student athlete protections is
encouraging, it is important to remember that these protections are just one small piece of the
larger fight for augmented transgender protections in all areas of the law. Giving proper analysis
to the way in which transgender athlete cases intersect with other legislative measures aimed at
reducing the status of transgender individuals is essential to understanding the challenges the
LGBTQ+ community and its allies face. Identifying these obstacles and creating a plan to address
them is crucial to work toward creating a sound legal landscape for transgender individuals in their
school years and beyond.
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CONCLUSION
The growing demand to address transgender student protections in the educational context
has been met with varying policy responses. Although the recognition of transgender rights has
occurred at all levels of the government in the last thirty years, the judicial system has proven to
be the best avenue for securing transgender student protections under the law. Through a careful
evaluation of each branch of government’s response to the call for increased transgender student
protections, it is apparent that executive and legislative measures often fall short. Changing
executive guidelines render transgender student protections uncertain as each presidential
administration enters office and the deeply polarized nature of the country’s politics means state
legislatures often pass conflicting legislation. Although many agree that amending Title IX at the
federal level is necessary, the current political landscape makes updating the statute to clarify its
meaning and scope unlikely.
While litigation may be a less expedient method for securing transgender student rights
under the law, state and federal court decisions provide a heightened level of security because they
are insulated from political influences and changing administrative regulations. Additionally,
overturning judicial rulings is often a more tedious process than revising executive branch actions.
The introduction and reliance upon the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in
recent Title IX cases—the “coupling’ effect—provides another safeguard as it offers transgender
students a legally robust basis for staking claims of discrimination despite Title IX regulations or
state legislation that may reduce protections. This is further supported by Professor R. Shep
Melnick, who, though highly critical of informal Title IX policymaking procedures, states: “The
major reason Republican presidents have had such trouble revising Title IX rules is that they are
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so embedded in court precedence.”319 This accurate observation supports the very heart of the
argument in favor of continued litigations.
Although many questions concerning transgender student protections remain unresolved,
especially in the athletic context, new and ongoing litigation will undoubtedly continue to provide
answers to these complicated issues in the near future. Indeed, the strong legal foundation
established in recent years for transgender students to combat discriminatory treatment offers
promising evidence that transgender student protections will continue to expand in the judiciary in
an effort to create a safe and equitable educational experience for all children regardless of their
gender identity.
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